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ARTICLES
THE PROS AND CONS OF POLITICALLY
REVERSIBLE “SEMISUBSTANTIVE”
CONSTITUTIONAL RULES
Dan T. Coenen*
Most observers of constitutional adjudication believe that it works in an
all-or-nothing way. On this view, the substance of challenged rules is of
decisive importance, so that political decision makers may resuscitate
invalidated laws only by way of constitutional amendment. This conception
of constitutional law is incomplete. In fact, courts often use so-called
“semisubstantive” doctrines that focus on the processes that nonjudicial
officials have used in adopting constitutionally problematic rules. When a
court strikes down a rule by using a motive-centered or legislative-findings
doctrine, for example, political decision makers may revive that very rule
without need for a constitutional amendment. For such an effort to
succeed, however, those decision makers must comply with special,
deliberation-enhancing procedural requirements crafted by courts to
ensure that constitutional concerns receive fair attention in the lawmaking
process.
Is semisubstantive review legitimate and sensible? In this Article, the
author disentangles—and then responds to—each of ten critiques that
judges and scholars have directed at semisubstantive decision making.
While acknowledging that most of these critiques have some merit, the
author concludes that courts should continue to deploy semisubstantive
doctrines as one, but not the only, tool of constitutional review. This
approach, it is argued, serves a worthy aim. It protects constitutional
values in a meaningful way, while taking due account of the salience of
republican self-rule.
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INTRODUCTION
The “unelected federal judiciary” has taken blows from many critics,
including unelected federal judges themselves.1 Most complaints proceed
from the premise that courts make constitutional rulings that “withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy” by “plac[ing]
them beyond the reach of majorities.”2 On this view, the substance of the
challenged rule or practice is all-important.3 Teacher-led prayers in
Racially segregated
classrooms violate the Establishment Clause.4
education runs afoul of the equal protection guarantee.5 And bans on
previability abortions offend protections of liberty embodied in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.6 Judicially recognized limits of this kind are
“hard-and-fast” because the only way elected officials may undo them is by
amending the U.S. Constitution.7
It is not surprising that democracy-minded critics of the courts focus on
these substance-centered prohibitions. These prohibitions, after all, block
elected decision makers from achieving legal outcomes that even large
majorities of their constituents deem important. It is for this reason that
American constitutional law has a strong “countermajoritarian” cast.8
Many constitutional rulings, however, do not concern only the
substantive action the government has taken. Rather, courts sometimes
apply so-called “semisubstantive” doctrines, which take account of both the

1. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[U]nelected federal judges have been usurping [Congress’s] lawmaking power . . . .”); see
also John Gramm, Letter to the Editor, We Need to Pray for Our Elected Officials, THE
PANTAGRAPH, Feb. 12, 2004, at A10 (“It’s certainly too bad that our nation has degenerated
to the point that unelected officials in our government, especially in the judicial department
and the higher court federal judge system, usurp authority that is unconstitutional and biased
against religion.”).
2. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
3. See id. (suggesting that the “very purpose” of having constitutional rights is “to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to
be applied by the courts”).
4. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
5. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954).
6. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–53, 869–70 (1992).
7. Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values
with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1578–80
(2001) (describing content-centered nature of legislatively nonreversible constitutional rules)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
8. The leading treatment of this subject is ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). In it, Professor
Alexander Bickel describes the judicial-review-wielding U.S. Supreme Court as a “deviant
institution in the American democracy.” Id. at 18. See generally Barry Friedman, The
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334 (1998) (“The ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ has been the
central obsession of modern constitutional scholarship.”). For two leading efforts to
reconcile judicial review with democratic self-governance, see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) and JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
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challenged rule’s substance and the process that brought the rule into effect.
Consider the following examples:
1.
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,9 the
U.S. Supreme Court overturned Congress’s effort to invoke
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state
sovereign immunity with regard to money-damages claims under
the Americans with Disabilities Act. In doing so, however, the
Court did not foreclose the possibility that such an abrogation
could take place. Instead, it found that Congress had not
“documented” constitutional violations that were sufficiently
widespread to trigger its remedial Section 5 power.10 The
implication of the Court’s analysis was clear: if Congress could
and did provide proper documentation, a new law that exactly
replicated the one struck down in Garrett would survive
constitutional attack.11
2.
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,12 the Court invalidated a
municipal program under which all passing vehicles were stopped
at fixed police checkpoints in an effort to thwart illegal drug use.
In distinguishing earlier Fourth Amendment authorities that
upheld similar “‘special needs’” searches, the Court deemed it
determinative that local lawmakers’ “primary purpose was to
detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”13 Again, the
implication of the Court’s reasoning was clear: if the city
reinstituted an identical checkpoint program, but did so for the
proper purpose of getting dangerous drug-using drivers off the
road, it would seem that the new program would
pass
Indeed, the majority in Edmond
constitutional muster.14
acknowledged that “a program impelled by licit purposes is
permitted, even though the challenged conduct may be outwardly
similar.”15
9. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
10. Id. at 372.
11. For a more detailed discussion of Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett, see for example William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record
Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87, 117–19 (2001); Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court,
Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
1281, 1325–26 (2002); Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the
Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE
L.J. 1707, 1725–27 (2002).
12. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
13. Id. at 37–38.
14. See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, Introduction: 2006 Fourth Amendment Symposium:
Programmatic Purpose, Subjective Intent, and Objective Intent: What Is the Proper Role of
“Purpose” Analysis To Measure the Reasonableness of a Search or Seizure?, 76 MISS. L.J.
i, vii n.17 (2006) (“[N]othing in the Edmond Court’s analysis would prevent Indianapolis
from simply re-labeling its program and conducting the same screening for drugs . . . .”).
15. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47; see also id. at 37–38 (distinguishing early ruling that
upheld fixed checkpoints in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444
(1990), on the ground that that program “aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road”);
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In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,16 the Court considered whether a
state could constitutionally extend sales-tax collection obligations
to “a vendor whose only contacts with [it] are by mail or common
carrier.”17 The Court overturned the challenged program, but was
careful to base its ruling on the dormant Commerce Clause, and
not the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.18 The
upshot was that the Court’s ruling—like all dormant Commerce
Clause rulings—became reversible by way of ordinary
congressional legislation, so that joint action by state and federal
lawmakers could reinstate exactly the same rule the Court had just
struck down.19 Indeed, the Court trumpeted this feature of its
work, proclaiming that “Congress is now free to decide whether,
when, and to what extent the States may burden interstate mailorder concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.”20
In each of these cases, governmental processes had dispositive
significance. None of the cases, however, involved the application of
traditional procedural due process principles, because those principles focus
on process-related requirements in the adjudicative setting. Put another
way, the Court in Garrett, Edmond, and Quill did not direct attention to the
processes by which discrete disputes were resolved; instead, it directed
attention to the processes by which lawmakers promulgated rules of broad
application because the substance of those rules raised a constitutional red
flag. As a consequence, in each of these cases, the Court made only a
provisional move. By focusing on the process that led to the law’s
enactment, the Court signaled that exactly the same law or practice that the
Court had found objectionable would survive constitutional attack if
political authorities, in a second go-round, avoided the initial process error.
Congress might make the findings deemed essential in Garrett; after
Edmond, the City Council might reinstitute drug checkpoints by acting
without an impermissible motive; and Congress might bless state efforts to
impose the same nexus-stretching taxing scheme deemed unlawful in Quill.
In short, process mattered no less than substance in these cases, which is
3.

id. at 47 n.2 (“[W]e need not decide whether the State may establish a checkpoint program
with the primary purpose of checking . . . driver sobriety and a secondary purpose of
interdicting narcotics.”); id. at 55–56 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]f the Indianapolis
police had assigned a different purpose to their activity here, but in no way changed what
was done on the ground to individual motorists, it might well be valid.”).
16. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
17. Id. at 311.
18. Id. at 318.
19. See, e.g., Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S.
159, 174 (1985) (noting that combination of state and federal legislation defeated a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge to state exclusion of nonresident bank holding companies). See
generally DAN T. COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 292–96 (2004);
1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-35, at 1242–45 (3d ed. 2000)
(discussing congressional authorization of otherwise impermissible state regulation).
20. Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.
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why they involved “semisubstantive,” rather than fully substantive,
doctrines of constitutional law.21
Semisubstantive rules take many forms. Indeed, in an earlier work I
catalogued nine separate semisubstantive techniques, each of which has
given rise to multiple subdoctrines.22 All of these rules share a democracyforcing, dialogic quality.23 In essence, nonjudicial authorities can dodge the
constitutional trap if, but only if, they act in a way that gives focused
attention to the important constitutional values raised by the challenged
practice.
To be sure, semisubstantive rules do not stand alone in constitutional law
because nonsemisubstantive hard-and-fast rules continue to apply in many
settings.24 In addition, semisubstantive review does not rear its head every
time parties present constitutional claims; instead, it tends to surface only
when particularly significant constitutional values are at play.25 None of
21. This type of review has received many names, such as “structural due process,”
Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975); “due
process of lawmaking,” Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197
(1976); and “Type III judicial review,” Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term—
Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan
Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 83 (1991). I prefer “semisubstantive review”
because (1) it directs attention to the substantive constitutional constraints that such review
implicates, and (2) other labels—particularly labels that incorporate the term “due
process”—improperly imply that this form of review derives exclusively or primarily from
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See infra notes 121–34
and accompanying text (developing the idea that semisubstantive review does not derive
solely, or primarily, from the Due Process Clauses).
22. The doctrinal categories are: (1) rules of clarity; (2) form-based deliberation rules;
(3) proper-findings-and-study rules; (4) representation-reinforcing structural rules; (5) timedriven second-look rules; (6) thoughtful-treatment-of-the-area rules; (7) constitutional
common-law and common-law-like rules; (8) proper-purpose rules; and (9) constitutional
“who” rules. See generally Coenen, supra note 7, at 1587–805 (providing descriptions and
examples of each form).
23. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 82 (1996) (noting that semisubstantive doctrines
can “require[] state officials to set out criteria on their own and . . . in that way [be]
democracy-forcing”; adding that these rules are “intended to catalyze and improve, rather
than to preempt, democratic processes”). It is important to recognize that semisubstantive
review involves only one of several ways in which courts involve other arms of government
in the elaboration of constitutional law. For a helpful review of different dialogic
approaches, see Christine Bateup, The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential
Theories of Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1109 (2006). For a brief effort to
locate semisubstantive decision making in the broader context of constitutional law in
general and dialogic techniques in particular, see Coenen, supra note 7, at 1579–81.
24. See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1579; see also supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text
(discussing school prayer, race-segregation, and abortion cases).
25. See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1585–86. Some commentators have argued for a more
across-the-board approach, at least with respect to certain forms of semisubstantive
doctrines. For a recent proposal that would render findings-and-study rules applicable to all
federal legislation (not just legislation that raises particularly significant constitutional
problems), see Victor Goldfeld, Note, Legislative Due Process and Simple Interest Group
Politics: Ensuring Minimal Deliberation Through Judicial Review of Congressional
Processes, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 367 (2004). For an argument that all judicial rulings of
constitutional law should be reversible by ordinary legislation, see Kenneth Ward,
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this changes the fact, however, that semisubstantive review has deep roots
and broad effects within American law.26
Given the pervasiveness of semisubstantive decision making, a simple
question suggests itself: is this form of judicial intervention legitimate and
advisable? No thorough treatment of this issue now exists, although
commentators have raised many questions about this style of review.
During the 1980s, for example, Professor Mark Tushnet voiced doubts
about the semisubstantive methodology.27 His comments, however,
focused on worries that this style of decision making might emerge as a
grand theory of constitutional law28—a role for such decision making
neither claimed by the Court nor advocated in this Article.29 Other
treatments have aimed at smaller targets. Professors Philip Frickey and
Steven Smith have suggested, for example, that the sort of findings-related
intervention exemplified by Garrett reflects an inattentiveness to the
practical operation of a 535-member, two-house, committee-driven,
logrolling-oriented Congress.30 These texts and others illuminate particular
Legislative Overrides as a Check on Judicial Review (2007) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://works.bepress.com/kenneth_ward/1/. For one effort to build on the use of
semisubstantive review in a particular doctrinal context, see David A. Sklansky, QuasiAffirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1292–99
(2002) (advocating that courts “search for ways” to develop Constitution-based rules of
criminal procedure that “minimize the dangers of intruding into decisions normally left to
the political branches,” including through use of rules “‘reversible’ by the political
branches”).
26. This style of decision making also pervades constitutional law on the international
stage. In Great Britain, Canada, and New Zealand, for example, “legislatures [possess] the
power to have the final word on what the law is,” following judicial determinations of
unconstitutionality. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of
Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 746 (2001).
27. MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 201–13 (1988). Professor Mark Tushnet has argued that semisubstantive review is
“beset by several difficulties.” Id. at 206. He has further noted that “proponents of structural
review have failed to confine the Court’s discretion both in deciding when to invoke
structural review and in deciding when its requirements are satisfied.” Id. at 208. He finally
concluded that “[s]tructural review may fail as a theory.” Id. at 213. In the text, I
specifically reference Professor Tushnet’s work “[d]uring the 1980s,” because in later years
he seems to have seen greater value in judicial use of these doctrines. See Mark Tushnet,
Subconstitutional Constitutional Law: Supplement, Sham, or Substitute?, 42 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2001) (“Normatively, a combination of full democratic choice coupled
with subconstitutional doctrines to ensure that such choice is informed, carefully made, and
the like, might be more attractive than a system in which democratic choice is limited
substantively by the courts.”).
28. See supra note 27.
29. Over the years, some commentators have endorsed politically reversible judicial
review as a general theory, at least in specified fields, such as substantive due process. See
generally Calabresi, supra note 21; Daniel O. Conkle, Nonoriginalist Constitutional Rights
and the Problem of Judicial Finality, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 9 (1985); Terrance
Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977). For an
approach to judicial review that would “allow Congress and the President to override judicial
precedents through ordinary legislation,” see Ward, supra note 25, at 1.
30. See Frickey & Smith, supra note 11, at 1755 (finding that the Court’s approach
“lacks an adequate conceptualization of legislative actors, has an excessively narrow
definition of the legislative record, and appears to reflect an inaccurate view of deliberation
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pathways for challenging semisubstantive decision making. None of them,
however, provides anything that approaches a comprehensive catalogue of
problems, much less a systematic set of responses.
This Article offers a wide-ranging evaluation of the integrity and wisdom
of semisubstantive rules. In Part I, I document the nature and scope of this
style of decision making, including by offering a typology of
semisubstantive doctrines built around so-called “how,” “why,” “when,”
and “who” rules. In Part II, I turn to the merits of the semisubstantive
methodology by evaluating ten separate critiques. Although most of these
critiques have some force, I conclude that none of them justifies
abandonment of this style of constitutional decision making. There is much
to be said, both pro and con, about the merits of semisubstantive review. In
the end, however, I conclude that nonexclusive use of these rules provides a
valuable mechanism for promoting interbranch and federal-state dialogue
while giving substantive constitutional values their due.31
I. THE FORMS OF SEMISUBSTANTIVE REVIEW
The Supreme Court has never sought to catalogue the many sorts of
semisubstantive rules that it uses in constitutional cases. Close analysis
reveals, however, that these rules may be gathered into groupings that
reflect the how, why, when, and who of the lawmaking process.
“How” rules, such as the rule of Garrett, evaluate the manner in which a
law came into being, including by looking at whether the lawmaking body
made a focused assessment of the constitutional issues at stake. “Why”
rules, such as the Fourth Amendment doctrine of Edmond, consider whether
an impermissible motive tainted the lawmaking process. “When” rules
focus on the impact of time in assessing constitutionality; in particular, an
encounter with a law promulgated long ago may lead judges to force a
legislative reappraisal in the absence of recent efforts at repeal or reform.
“Who” rules focus on whether the best decision maker—a nationallyminded Congress, rather than a locally-minded state legislature, as in Quill,
for example—has signed off on the challenged practice. Judicial use of
each of these doctrines leaves the door open for the political branches to put

and the legislative process”). Other commentators have criticized findings-based rulings as
well. See A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The
Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 328, 331 (2001) (stating that the Court’s approach “is fundamentally ill
advised”); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 90–91 (asserting that the Court’s approach
“demonstrates judicial suspicion of congressional motives” and has “no support in precedent
or in constitutional text or structure”); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress,
100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 85 (2001) (raising the concern that the “[Court’s] record requirement
could not reasonably have been anticipated at the moment of legislative deliberation ”); see
also Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 412–20 (describing objections to court-imposed “legislative
due process” rules).
31. For a truncated enumeration of arguments for semisubstantive review, see Coenen,
supra note 7, at 1834–45.
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in place legal rules that would not satisfy the courts if enacted by way of
ordinary lawmaking processes.
A. Constitutional “How” Rules
“How” rules do not deem determinative the “what” of a challenged
law—that is, the content of the law’s substantive restriction. Rather, they
focus on how the law came to be. As a result, as with other semisubstantive
doctrines, when a court invalidates a law (or deems it inapplicable to the
situation at hand) by using a constitutional “how” rule, the legislature
remains free to readopt it (or render it applicable to the situation at hand) if
it corrects judicially identified shortcomings in the lawmaking process.32
How-based review often entails judicial use of constitutionally inspired
“clear statement” rules,33 as illustrated by Solid Waste Agency v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers.34 There, the Court considered whether the
Army Corps of Engineers had acted properly when it blocked the filling of
a local rain-collecting sand and gravel pit.35 In taking this action, the Corps
relied on its “Migratory Bird Rule,” which in essence required federal
approval to tamper with any body of water frequented by migrating ducks
and geese.36 The landowners’ challenge raised two questions: (1) whether
the Corps had exceeded its statutory authority under the Clean Water Act to
regulate “‘waters of the United States’” by interpreting the Act to cover
“isolated, intrastate” ponds, and (2) whether Congress had power under the
Commerce Clause to grant the Agency this scope of regulatory
jurisdiction.37
The Court determined that the Corps’s view of its authority reached too
far as a matter of statutory law, thereby avoiding the constitutional
question.38 In steering this course, the Court relied on the principle that
“[w]here an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer
limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress
intended that result.”39 The Court also cited a second clear-statement rule
that focused on the constitutional importance of state autonomy. According
to the Court, judicial concerns are “heightened where the administrative
interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal

32. See Coenen, supra note 11, at 1287 (describing constitutional “how” rules).
33. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 355–82 (2d ed. 2006). The authors discuss substantive canons, including
those that “correlate with basic values embedded in the Constitution,” id. at 357, and
consider in detail the preference for avoiding serious constitutional questions, as well as
federalism-driven canons, which seem designed to encourage Congress to “deliberate
carefully about . . . intrusions upon core state functions.” Id. at 358.
34. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
35. Id. at 162–63.
36. Id. at 163–65.
37. Id. at 163–66, 169 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006)).
38. Id. at 162.
39. Id. at 172.
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encroachment upon a traditional state power.”40 Because “[p]ermitting
respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats . . . would
result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary
power over land and water use”41—and because Congress had not
expressed a “clear” desire “to readjust the federal-state balance in this
manner”—the Court overturned the Corps’s federal licensing scheme.42
In relying on Congress’s lack of clarity with regard to authorizing the
Migratory Bird Rule, the Court protected the constitutional value of
federalism. At the same time, the Court did not foreclose the possibility
that Congress could reinstate the rule, so long as it abided by the Court’s
how-based mandate that it speak in unambiguous terms. In this way, the
Court protected an important substantive constitutional value while
permitting Congress to continue to explore the justifiability of this form of
federal regulation.
A different sort of “how” rule proved decisive in Thompson v.
Oklahoma.43 That case presented the question whether the execution of
murderers who were younger than sixteen at the time of the offense violated
the Eighth Amendment.44 Three members of the Court, led by Justice
Scalia, concluded that no constitutional rule barred the death sentence in
these circumstances, in part because many states had long authorized the
practice.45 Four members of the Court, led by Justice Stevens, reasoned
that “‘evolving standards of decency’” rendered this sort of state action
unconstitutional.46 Justice O’Connor supplied the decisive vote to block the
execution by relying on a how-based semisubstantive rationale.47
Accepting the premise of Justice Stevens’s approach, Justice O’Connor
first noted that an emerging national consensus might preclude the
execution of Thompson and others like him.48 Unsatisfied with the
evidence on that point,49 however, she took an admittedly “unusual”
approach to the case.50 Justice O’Connor emphasized that the Oklahoma
legislature had never directly approved the execution of juvenile offenders
in a focused way.51 Instead, the defendant was death-eligible because of
the joint operation of two separate provisions—one that authorized the
death penalty for adult offenders, and another that permitted trying juvenile
offenders as adults for a variety of crimes.52 In Justice O’Connor’s view,
40. Id. at 173.
41. Id. at 174.
42. Id. at 172, 174.
43. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
44. Id. at 818–19.
45. Id. at 859–78 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 821 (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
47. Id. at 848–59 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy did not participate in the
Thompson v. Oklahoma decision. Id. at 838.
48. Id. at 848–49.
49. Id. at 849.
50. Id. at 858.
51. Id. at 857.
52. Id.
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imposing the death sentence in these circumstances offended the Court’s
“important and consistent” demand “for special care and deliberation in
decisions that may lead to the imposition of that sanction.”53 As she
explained,
Because it proceeded in this manner, there is a considerable risk that the
Oklahoma Legislature either did not realize that its actions would have the
effect of rendering 15-year-old defendants death eligible or did not give
the question the serious consideration that would have been reflected in
the explicit choice of some minimum age for death eligibility.54

Put another way, the state could not impose a death sentence in Thompson
because its legislature had not acted with sufficient particularity and care.
For Justice O’Connor (herself a former state senator), how the legislature
had proceeded was determinative, regardless of whether the execution of
youthful murderers was substantively prohibited by the Eighth Amendment
in a hard-and-fast way.55
Justice Scalia rejected this rationale in no-nonsense terms. He observed
that he knew of “no authority whatever for our specifying the precise form
that state legislation must take, as opposed to its constitutionally required
content.”56 In his view, Justice O’Connor’s “brand new principle” was a
“loose cannon” that struck at the heart of state sovereignty.57 But Justice
Scalia’s critique fell on deaf ears; Justice O’Connor’s semisubstantive
methodology in fact provided the key fifth vote for overturning
Thompson’s death sentence.
As Garrett illustrates, some “how” rules target statutes put in place
without adequate findings or study. In United States v. Lopez,58 for
example, the Court invalidated a federal ban on gun possession near schools
on the ground that it reached beyond Congress’s commerce power.59 In
doing so, the Court noted that the legislative record contained no
explanation of the connection between this form of gun possession and the
operation of interstate markets.60 The Court acknowledged that “Congress
normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial
burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce.”61 Yet it also observed
that “we of course consider legislative findings, and indeed even
congressional committee findings, regarding effect on interstate
53. Id. at 856.
54. Id. at 857.
55. Notably, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Thompson does not stand alone in using this
sort of extra-super-clear-statement rule. See Coenen, supra note 11, at 1308–13 (discussing
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion on congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity in
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 99–109 (2000), and its similarities to the
Thompson concurrence).
56. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 876–77 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 877.
58. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
59. Id. at 551–52.
60. Id. at 562.
61. Id.
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commerce.”62 Applying these principles, the Court declared, “to the extent
that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate
commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked
eye, they are lacking here.”63
Some findings-or-study rules involve individual rights, rather than
federal powers. In Reno v. ACLU,64 for example, the Court considered
whether the broad restriction on “indecent” Internet speech imposed by the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) ran afoul of the First Amendment.65
The Court’s analysis focused on whether this prohibition was “carefully
tailored” with respect to the goal of protecting minors in light of the
possible adequacy of less restrictive regulatory approaches.66 In the end,
the Court found a First Amendment violation, emphasizing that
“[p]articularly in the light of the absence of any detailed findings by the
Congress, or even hearings addressing the special problems of the CDA, we
are persuaded that the CDA is not narrowly tailored if that requirement has
any meaning at all.”67 This First Amendment findings-or-study rule does
not stand alone. In an earlier decision invalidating a broad “dial-a-porn”
prohibition, the Court likewise reasoned that “the congressional record
contains no legislative findings that would justify us in concluding that

62. Id.
63. Id. at 563. Building on United States v. Lopez, many lower court judges deemed the
presence or absence of findings decisive in assessing commerce-power cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 292 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting) (voting to
invalidate federal ban on machine gun possession as exceeding Congress’s commerce power,
but noting that he “would view this case differently if Congress as a whole or even one of the
responsible congressional committees had made a finding that intrastate machine gun
possession, by facilitating the commission of certain crimes, has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce”); see also id. at 279 (majority opinion) (reasoning that, “unlike the
situation in Lopez, there are legislative findings,” although made in connection with earlier
firearms legislation). In its post-Lopez decision in United States v. Morrison, a five-Justice
majority of the Court invalidated a law that created a federal action for sex-based violence
notwithstanding the existence of extensive congressional findings that such action, in the
aggregate, substantially harms interstate commerce. 529 U.S. 598, 601–02, 614 (2000). The
four dissenters sought to distinguish Lopez on precisely this ground. Id. at 628–29 (Souter,
J., dissenting). And the majority itself did not foreclose the possibility that congressional
findings might prove important in other commerce-power cases, particularly cases not
involving violent crime. As the Court noted, “the existence of congressional findings is not
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.” Id. at
614 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). The majority also declined to “adopt a categorical
rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity” for analysis under the
affecting-commerce prong of the commerce-power, id. at 613, thereby giving the Court
“room to give weight to the presence or absence of legislative findings in some future
commerce power cases,” Coenen, supra note 11, at 1322.
64. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
65. See id. at 870–71.
66. Id. at 871.
67. Id. at 879.
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there is no constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means, short of a total
ban, to achieve the Government’s interest in protecting minors.”68
Two other constitutional “how” rules sometimes make an appearance.
On occasion, courts apply constitutionally inspired rules that are
legislatively reversible because of their “common-law-like” nature. By way
of example, rules that limit what instructions and inquiries judges may pose
to deadlocked criminal juries appear to meet this description.69 In other
cases, courts deploy so-called “form-based . . . rules.”70 In applying the
dormant Commerce Clause, for example, the Court has routinely
invalidated tax breaks that favor local businesses without questioning the
constitutionality of affirmative subsidies that have identical economic
effects.71 What is more, judicial recognition of this distinction between tax
breaks and subsidies has its roots in semisubstantive reasoning. As one
court has explained, because an outright subsidy “involves the direct
transfer of public monies,” it is “subject to heightened political visibility”
and resulting incentives for care when the legislature acts.72
68. Sable Commc’ns of Ca., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989). Something like the
flipside of this reasoning played a role in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Ashcroft
v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 564, 591 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring). There, four
members of the Court voted to uphold more limited Internet-pornography legislation passed
in the wake of Reno v. ACLU. Id. at 566. In his critical, fifth-vote concurring opinion,
Justice Kennedy observed,
Congress and the President were aware of our decision, and we should assume that
in seeking to comply with it they have given careful consideration to the
constitutionality of the new enactment. For these reasons, even if this facial
challenge appears to have considerable merit, the Judiciary must proceed with
caution and identify overbreadth with care before invalidating the Act.
Id. at 591–92 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Notwithstanding its rejection of an overbreadth
challenge in Ashcroft I, the Court later, in Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft II), 542 U.S. 656
(2004), upheld a U.S. district court’s preliminary injunction of the Act based on findings that
a less restrictive alternative, in the form of parental installation of filtering software,
remained available. In dissent, Justice Breyer asked pointedly, “[W]hat has happened to the
‘constructive discourse between our courts and our legislatures’ that ‘is an integral and
admirable part of the constitutional design’?” Id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 326 (2004)). As Justice Breyer elaborated, “Congress
read Reno with care. It dedicated itself to the task of drafting a statute that would meet each
and every criticism of the predecessor statute that this Court set forth in Reno. . . . What else
was Congress supposed to do?” Id. at 690.
69. See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1738 (discussing cases).
70. Id. at 1642. See generally id. at 1640–55 (discussing use of form-based rules to
foster deliberative policymaking).
71. For some additional rules of this nature, see Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi
Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 109–14 (2005) (holding that application of rules designed to protect
sovereignty of Native American tribes hinges on whether “legal incidence” of state salesrelated fuel tax, as revealed by statutory phrasing, falls on off-reservation distribution, rather
than on-reservation purchases), and Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 515
U.S. 450, 460 (1995) (“[I]f a State is unable to enforce a tax because the legal incidence of
the impost is on Indians or Indian tribes, the State generally is free to amend its law to shift
the tax’s legal incidence.”).
72. Pelican Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards, 901 F. Supp.
1125, 1137 (M.D. La. 1995). Another sort of “how” rule is the “thoughtful treatment of the
area” rule. Coenen, supra note 7, at 1727–34 (discussing thoughtful-treatment rules with
regard to death penalty, speech-licensing, vagueness, and punitive-damages law). For one
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B. Constitutional “Why” Rules
Many doctrines of constitutional law focus on the purpose with which the
lawgiver acted. In Washington v. Davis,73 for example, the Court held that
even facially neutral laws will trigger heightened scrutiny if they are
adopted with the purpose of disadvantaging a racial minority or other
protected group.74 In similar fashion, the Establishment Clause mandates
invalidation of laws enacted with a sectarian motive.75 As illustrated by
Edmond, the Fourth Amendment has spawned its own semisubstantive
“why” rule.76 Still other motive-centered doctrines lurk in the Court’s free
speech, free exercise, dormant Commerce Clause, and Bill of Attainder
cases,77 as well as in other constitutional fields.78
Rules of this kind are semisubstantive in nature for a simple reason: their
logic dictates that exactly the same law will or will not be constitutional
depending on the mental process that led to its adoption.79 Hunter v.
Underwood80 illustrates the point. There, the Court encountered an
Alabama law that disenfranchised any person who had committed a crime
involving moral turpitude.81 The Court struck down this facially neutral
exclusion on equal protection grounds because it had been promulgated
with the purpose of keeping African Americans off the voting rolls.82 In
invalidating the measure, however, the Court was careful to leave open the
question “whether [it] would be valid if enacted today without any
impermissible motivation.”83 The Court thus shifted the “burden of
inertia”84 back to state lawmakers who might try to put the provision back
in place, but only if they could do so in a process purged of racial bias.

example, see Sklansky, supra note 25, at 1275–76 (noting that “[i]n a few limited areas, the
Court has indicated that searches and seizures may satisfy the Fourth Amendment in part
because they are carried out pursuant to formal regulations” and discussing inventory and
administrative searches as examples).
73. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
74. Id. at 242.
75. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59–60 (1985) (invalidating required
meditation in schools because of improper purpose); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612
(1971).
76. See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.
77. See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1759–61.
78. See id. at 1761 & nn.786 & 788.
79. See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson:
An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 115 (noting that purpose-based
doctrines permit reenactment of law “in identical form”); J. Morris Clark, Legislative
Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953, 1033
(1978) (same).
80. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
81. Id. at 223.
82. Id. at 233.
83. Id.
84. See infra notes 283–84 and accompanying text.
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C. Constitutional “When” Rules
Thoughtful commentators have raised the question whether courts, at
least sometimes, should force legislatures to reconsider long-surviving
statutes that appear to have outlived their usefulness.85 More particularly, if
old statutes implicate particularly significant constitutional concerns, courts
might invoke semisubstantive “when” rules to force a legislative
reappraisal.86 Are courts open to using this technique? Some cases suggest
they may be.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,87 the Court confronted a state ban on
contraceptive use, which had been adopted in 1879 based in part on the
view that nonreproductive sexual intercourse is morally wrong.88 This
potential justification for the law was brushed aside by the Court in
Griswold because (according to Justice White’s concurrence) counsel in the
case offered “no serious contention that Connecticut [thought] the use
of . . . contraception [was] immoral.”89 This mode of analysis raises an
obvious question: what if, following the Court’s invalidation of the
Connecticut statute, state legislators reenacted the same law and specifically
relied on the immorality of nonprocreative sex? In effect, by dismissing
this justification as out-of-date, the Court left open the possibility that the
state could reinstate the statute and defend it on this previously
unconsidered ground. Put another way, the Court invited the legislature to
revive an old justification for an old statute, but only if a new legislature in
new conditions concluded that the justification had merit.90
Related to this type of no-longer-advanced-justification reasoning is the
“concept of desuetude,”91 which courts sometimes use to invalidate laws
that have generated few prosecutions over an extended period of time.92
This doctrine has not taken firm hold in American jurisprudence.93
Professor Cass Sunstein has suggested, however, that it provides the best
way to view the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the state sodomy ban at

85. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 135 (photo.
reprint 1999) (1982) (“[I]t is possible that a code can become so out of phase with everything
else in the law that a forced legislative reconsideration becomes appropriate.”).
86. See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1698–726 (analyzing judicial use of time-driven
second-look rules when evaluating regulations that “raise particularly serious constitutional
concerns”).
87. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
88. See Tribe, supra note 21, at 298–303 (discussing this aspect of Griswold).
89. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 505 (White, J., concurring).
90. For another case of this sort, see Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 641 n.9 (1974) (invalidating ban on teaching by women who were more than four
months pregnant where the rule’s defenders did not contend that its original purpose of
shielding schoolchildren from visibly pregnant women could support the challenged policy
in the present day).
91. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 148.
92. See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1704–08.
93. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi’s Uncommon
Common Law for a Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1132 n.14 (1982).
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issue in Lawrence v. Texas.94 As he put the point in discussing the
interpretive philosophy he describes as “minimalism,”
Minimalists insist that the real problem in Lawrence, and in many
other cases involving sexual privacy, was procedural. In the last decades,
sodomy prosecutions have been rare and unpredictable, simply because
the public would not stand for many of them. Emphasizing this point,
minimalists contend that Lawrence, and many of the Court’s privacy
decisions, should be understood as an American variation on the old
English idea of desuetude. According to that idea, laws lapse, and can no
longer be enforced, when their enforcement has already become
exceedingly rare because the principle behind them has become
hopelessly out of step with people’s convictions.95

As Professor Alexander Bickel explained many years earlier, the effect of a
ruling based on the doctrine of desuetude is not to foreclose democratic
action. Rather, it is “to turn the thrust of forces favoring and opposing the
present objectives of the statute toward the legislature, where the power of
at least initial decision properly belongs in our system.”96 In other words,
popular forces—if strong enough—can breathe new life into an old
provision by pushing political authorities to return it to active duty.97
“When” rules—like “what” and “how” rules—protect fundamental
constitutional values because they result in the invalidation of
constitutionally troublesome laws. At the same time, this form of
invalidation invites a legislative reprise so long as lawmakers act with care.
In voting to strike down New York’s ban on assisted suicide, for example,
Judge Guido Calabresi took precisely this approach. He began by
explaining that “[t]he statutes at issue were born in another age” and that
“the bases of [them] have been deeply eroded over the last hundred and
fifty years.”98 For these reasons, he declared that the assisted suicide ban
could not continue to operate. At the same time, he chose to “leave open
the question of whether, if the [S]tate of New York were to enact new laws
prohibiting assisted suicide (laws that either are less absolute in their

94. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
95. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE
WRONG FOR AMERICA 97 (2005) (footnote omitted); see also Sunstein, supra note 23, at 68
(asserting that the Court’s earlier sodomy case, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
“should have been decided . . . the other way and very narrowly—as a case involving the old
and nicely minimalist idea, with democratic foundations, of desuetude”).
96. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 148.
97. A related time-tied style of judicial intervention is illustrated by the Court’s death
penalty decisions. In particular, when the Court invalidated every death penalty statute in
the nation in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), it did so in light of “evolving
standards of decency” as required by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). This result, however,
triggered a widespread reexamination of the death penalty, culminating in its reenactment in
many states and the Court’s upholding of that action in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976).
98. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 732, 735 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring),
rev’d, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
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application or are identical to those before us), such laws would stand or
fall.”99
The Supreme Court ultimately upheld assisted suicide restrictions, with
its principal decision coming in a case from Washington State.100 Even as
the Court sustained the Washington statute, however, it made a nod in the
direction of constitutional “when” rules.
In particular, the Court
emphasized that “[t]hough deeply rooted, the States’ assisted-suicide bans
have in recent years been reexamined and, generally, reaffirmed.”101 The
Court also catalogued recent developments in Washington itself, noting the
state’s focused reevaluation of its assisted suicide ban in 1975 and its
considered exclusion of the practice from actions authorized by the state’s
Natural Death Act twenty years later.102 Given these elements of the
Court’s reasoning, the question arises whether it would have jettisoned the
Washington law had no such recent reappraisals occurred. There is no way
to know the answer to this question. Were the Court to give these matters
decisive weight, however, it would be applying a semisubstantive “when”
rule.103
D. Constitutional “Who” Rules
Finally, there are constitutional “who” rules, which steer policy choices
from one nonjudicial decision maker to another. Quill and other dormant
Commerce Clause cases illustrate this approach by requiring
congressional—rather than merely state—endorsement of laws that threaten
the free flow of interstate and international commerce.104 Another leading
who-rule case is Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong.105 There, the Court
invalidated a ban on government employment of resident aliens that had
been promulgated by the Federal Civil Service Commission.106 In the
course of its decision, the Court first identified the interests advanced in
support of the prohibition, which included maximizing the President’s
power in treaty negotiations and encouraging aliens to become American
citizens.107 According to the Court, these interests might have supported
the rule had it come from Congress or the President.108 The Civil Service
Commission, however, was not the proper body to assess these
considerations because it had no responsibility for foreign affairs or
99. Id. at 732.
100. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
101. Id. at 716 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 716–17.
103. For a twist on the typical application of “when” rules, see Nickolai G. Levin,
Constitutional Statutory Synthesis, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1281 (2003) (arguing that applications of
statutes should change as constitutional doctrine changes, without necessitating judicial
negation of such statutes).
104. See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text.
105. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
106. Id. at 116–17.
107. Id. at 104.
108. Id. at 105.

COENEN FINAL

2852

4/26/2009 8:59:52 PM

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

naturalization policies.109 Put more bluntly, given the important equal
protection values at stake in the case, the Court concluded that the
Commission was not a proper “who” for the purpose of promulgating the
hiring ban.110
Justice Powell’s decisive opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke111 brought a similar style of analysis to bear. In voting
to strike down a state medical school’s affirmative-action admissions
program, he reasoned in part that nonjudicial efforts aimed at remedying
past constitutional wrongs should come from broadly accountable state
authorities, rather than “isolated” university officials.112 This result made
sense, according to Justice Powell, because university officials have
responsibility for “education, not the formulation of any legislative policy
or the adjudication of particular claims of illegality.”113 In his view,
“isolated segments of our vast governmental structures are not competent to
make those decisions, at least in the absence of legislative mandates and
legislatively determined criteria.”114
As Mow Sun Wong and Bakke show, “who” rules differ from other
semisubstantive doctrines because they do not result in a remand to the
same decision maker who propounded the suspect policy in the first place.
Instead, they channel authority to a different set of decision makers who are
perceived to be more deliberative, more competent, or more accountable.
As with other semisubstantive doctrines, however, “who” rules permit
political actors to put back in place the identical rule that the Court has
struck down. Indeed, with little delay, President Gerald Ford reinstated by
executive order the very same alien hiring ban that the Court had
invalidated in Mow Sun Wong.115 Subsequent judicial decisions upholding
this action powerfully illustrate the self-limiting and dialogic nature of
semisubstantive constitutional doctrines.116

109. Id. at 114.
110. Id. “Who” rules sometimes come to the fore in joint operation with other
semisubstantive doctrines. In Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531
U.S. 159 (2001), for example, the Court noted its view that an administrative interpretation
of a statute that comes too close to the outer bounds of congressional power would require a
clear indication from Congress that such a result was intended. Id. at 172; see supra notes
33–42 and accompanying text. Although the Court in Solid Waste Agency thus protected
federalism values by relying on a clear-statement “how” rule, it did so in a way that
effectively shifted policymaking authority from one set of decision makers (that is, an
executive agency) to another (that is, Congress).
111. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
112. Id. at 307–10.
113. Id. at 309.
114. Id.
115. Exec. Order No. 11,935, 5 C.F.R. § 7.3 (2008).
116. See, e.g., Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739, 746 (9th Cir. 1980); Vergara
v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281, 1287 (7th Cir. 1978).
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II. THE MERITS OF SEMISUBSTANTIVE RULES
Legal analysts have not systematically examined the legitimacy and
wisdom of semisubstantive rules. Some judicial opinions—such as Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Thompson—suggest lines of criticism,117 and academic
commentators have raised many challenges as well.118 Different observers
are sure to characterize available critiques in different ways. According to
my count, however, there are ten key assertions: (1) there is no legitimate
constitutional source for semisubstantive rules; (2) at the least, these rules
are at odds with an “originalist” methodology; (3) these rules are not
confinable because they lack a limiting principle; (4) semisubstantive rules
threaten legislative processes in a manner inconsistent with the separation
of powers and our legal traditions; (5) such rules encourage judicial
overreaching by giving a false impression of judicial restraint; (6) these
rules invite judicial corruption of otherwise useful restraints like the
vagueness doctrine; (7) the employment of semisubstantive rules is
inherently futile; (8) the use of these rules risks underenforcement of
constitutional norms; (9) semisubstantive rules reflect unrealistic
assumptions about political processes; and (10) semisubstantive rules, in
any event, lack a proper precedential pedigree.
In the pages that follow, I elaborate and evaluate each of these lines of
challenge.119 The task is large, and much must go unsaid. In particular,
semisubstantive doctrines differ from one another in important ways, and
this treatment focuses on relevant differences only in some respects.120
Even so, what is said here supports the argument that courts should
continue to use a wide range of semisubstantive safeguards as one vehicle
for vindicating substantive constitutional protections.
I turn now to the ten critiques.

117. See supra notes 45, 56–57 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
119. In an earlier article, I identified most of these critiques in an abbreviated form. See
Coenen, supra note 7, at 1845–50. In a responsive essay, Professor Tushnet observed that “a
more complete understanding of [these] doctrines will require us to grapple with . . .
objections that Professor Coenen mentions largely in passing.” Tushnet, supra note 27, at
1872. Professor Tushnet was right. Hence, this Article.
120. I note, however, that those respects are significant. In particular, I give focused
attention to both constitutional “who” rules and semisubstantive findings-and-study rules in
assessing Argument 9. See infra notes 299–328 and accompanying text. It also bears
emphasis that some semisubstantive doctrines cut across different substantive areas of
constitutional law. Legislative-findings rules, for example, have surfaced in cases involving
the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, the commerce power, and the Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power. See Frickey & Smith, supra note 11, at 1718–27. It is
always open to debate whether such rules should apply in some substantive contexts, but not
in others.
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A. Argument 1 (Illegitimacy): Semisubstantive Rules Are Illegitimate
Because They Lack a Proper Source in Constitutional Text or Accepted
Postulates of Constitutional Decision Making
Among the many questions raised about semisubstantive rules, the most
fundamental is the first. The question is:
from where do these rules
come? The answer is almost tautological: semisubstantive safeguards
emanate from those substantive rights that they seek to safeguard in
semisubstantive ways. There is, of course, no “semisubstantive rules”
clause in the Constitution, although there are Due Process Clauses that
might well serve to justify use of these process-centered doctrines.121 Some
cases, however, raise questions about the due-process rationale122 and—
even more important—there is no need to travel the due-process route. The
reason why is simple: the substantive rights at issue in constitutional cases
adequately justify application of semisubstantive constitutional rules.123
In all of the cases we have looked at, this connection is self-evident.
Reno v. ACLU124 is a free speech case; Griswold125 concerns the right of
privacy; Bakke126 involves equal protection; and so on. There is no express
reference to semisubstantive rules in the First, Fifth, or Fourteenth
Amendments. But so what? There is nothing in the language of those
amendments about such settled constitutional concepts as “public
121. It bears emphasis, in this regard, that the courts have invalidated many legislative
acts on the ground that those acts do not comport with so-called “substantive due process.”
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1992) (“‘[I]t is
settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of
substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.’” (quoting Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring))); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 467
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s decision as one harkening
back to the days of “substantive due process”). Yet, if the Due Process Clauses impose
substantive restraints on legislative behavior, should it not follow a fortiori that—at least
with highly sensitive constitutional settings—they impose process-based limits as well? See,
e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 550 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I see no
reason why the character of [congressional] procedures may not be considered relevant to
the decision whether the legislative product has caused a deprivation of liberty or property
without due process of law.”); Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 393 (relying on Due Process
Clauses for procedural safeguards embedded in study-and-findings rules); see also Mich.
Cent. R.R. v. Powers, 201 U.S. 245, 294 (1906) (leaving as an open question, with who-rule
dimension, whether grant of legislative power to the executive or judiciary would “work . . .
a denial of due process”).
122. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915)
(suggesting that due process protections may not apply to legislative actions); see also Mark
S. Kende, Comment, Principles of Competence: The Ability of Public Institutions to Adopt
Remedial Affirmative Action Plans, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 581, 607 (1986) (noting the
distinction between legislative and adjudicative actions with respect to due process
requirements).
123. But see Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2781, 2796 (2003) (questioning the basis for deciding which substantive values are
“‘distinctively deserving of [the] judicial protection’” of provisional review (quoting
Coenen, supra note 11, at 1283)).
124. 521 U.S. 844 (1997); see also supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
125. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
126. 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.
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forums,”127 multifactor or “total deprivation” regulatory-takings review,128
or “suspect classifications” and differing tiers of judicial scrutiny.129 The
fact is that the terse texts of the Constitution must be—and thus have
been—elaborated through the development of subsidiary doctrines built on
the deeper values that underlie those texts. Many of these doctrines have a
“prophylactic” quality in the sense that they protect potentially
underenforced constitutional values in a practical way.130 So it is with
semisubstantive rules.
Consider the basic notion of “heightened scrutiny” that pervades First
Amendment, right-to-privacy, and both classification-based and
The
fundamental-rights-based equal protection jurisprudence.131
Constitution itself nowhere refers to heightened scrutiny. Given the settled
recognition of this style of review, however, the Court has had no choice
but to develop sensible subrules to give the notion meaning and effect. As a
result, the Court has created rubrics—focusing on such matters as
“important” or “compelling” government interests, “less restrictive
alternatives,” and “narrowly tailored” laws—that accommodate
constitutional doctrine to underlying policy and institutional concerns.132 In
turn, the Court must give content to these subrules, and there is no apparent
reason why that content may not take the form of semisubstantive doctrines.
If the Court insists, for example, that legislative means must be “carefully
tailored” to take account of legislative ends,133 there is no reason why
courts must measure carefulness solely by looking to substantive outcomes,
without considering actual procedural carefulness itself.134 From this

127. See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79
(1992) (discussing forum-based approach in analyzing speech restrictions).
128. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (discussing
total deprivation of economic use as taking); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 124–28 (1978) (discussing factors to consider when determining whether just
compensation is due for regulatory taking when no per se taking is present).
129. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439–40 (1985)
(explaining levels of scrutiny applicable to equal protection challenges).
130. See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190
(1988) (discussing use of prophylactic rules in constitutional law, including in First
Amendment and equal protection contexts).
131. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-26, at 1011–15, §
15-9, at 1329–32, §§ 16-5 to 16-13, at 1451–66 (2d ed., 1988) (discussing strict scrutiny as
applied to freedom of association, rights of privacy and personhood, and as a tier of equal
protection review).
132. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661 (2004) (noting that the Court had previously
held the Communications Decency Act (CDA) unconstitutional in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844 (1997), “because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest and because less restrictive alternatives were available”).
133. Reno, 521 U.S. at 871 (questioning whether CDA had been “carefully tailored to the
congressional goal of protecting minors from potentially harmful materials”).
134. The rhetoric of several equal-protection cases dovetails with this conclusion. See,
e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725–26 (1982) (reasoning that the
purpose of heightened scrutiny is to foster “reasoned analysis”); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199, 214 (1977) (invalidating a law that discriminated on the basis of sex when
“nothing . . . suggest[ed] a reasoned congressional judgment” was made).
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vantage point, rules that focus on things like legislative thoroughness,
legislative purpose, and recent legislative reexaminations make good sense.
A critic of semisubstantive rules might question this logic by pointing to
important features of the constitutional text. The objector could note that
the Framers endorsed specialized decision-making processes for only
certain purposes—for example, by requiring a two-thirds Senate vote to
convict in an impeachment proceeding or to bring a treaty into effect.135
For the skeptic, these provisions create room for a negative-implication
argument against semisubstantive rules. After all, if the Constitution’s text
dictates the use of specialized decision-making structures in impeachment,
treaty-ratification, and other distinctive contexts, how can courts demand
the use of similarly specialized, but unenumerated, decision-making
structures in other settings? Expressio unius est exclusio alterius!136
The expressio unius argument has, at first blush, an enticing quality. On
close inspection, however, it tells us precious little about semisubstantive
judicial review. To begin with, the Constitution’s specialized process
terms—such as its two-thirds voting requirements—concern the operation
of only the national government; thus, even if the argument has merit, it
provides no obstacle to identifying semisubstantive rules that apply to the
states. Even more important, the expressio unius rule does not carry water
with regard to the national government itself. To be sure, that principle
would present a problem if, for example, the Court tried to say that all
exercises of the commerce power must receive a two-thirds Senate vote to
safeguard federalism values. The semisubstantive rules the Court has
wielded in the past, however, are a distant cry from this sort of jarringly
odd, strictly numerical, and obviously countertextual would-be
constitutional doctrine.
The Court, for example, has suggested that the presence of legislative
studies may prove decisive in cases that present commerce-power-based
regulation of highly localized, noncommercial activities.137 Such a rule of
basic attentiveness is far removed from any hypothetical two-thirds Senate
vote requirement. Indeed, when Congress makes no effort to tie ostensibly
noncommercial, regulatory programs to the vitality of interstate commerce,
there is reason to say that this manner of proceeding violates basic dictates
of constitutional structure. As the lower court observed in Lopez,
135. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (impeachment); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (treaties); see
also Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 380 (suggesting that the Speech or Debate Clause
may “preclude judicial supervision of congressional proceedings”); Buzbee & Schapiro,
supra note 11, at 151 (“Nothing in the Constitution dictates the sources of information that
legislators may consider in drafting and voting on legislation.”); Frickey & Smith, supra
note 11, at 1744 (noting that “[t]he Constitution does not . . . specify any process” for
legislative decision making).
136. “[T]o express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,
793 n.9 (1995) (discussing interaction of the expressio unius principle and the Qualifications
Clause).
137. See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text.

COENEN FINAL

2009]

4/26/2009 8:59:52 PM

“SEMISUBSTANTIVE” CONSTITUTIONAL RULES

2857

Courts cannot properly perform their duty to determine if there is any
rational basis for a Congressional finding [of a substantial effect on
interstate commerce] if neither the legislative history nor the statute itself
reveals any such relevant finding. And, in such a situation there is
nothing to indicate that Congress itself consciously fixed, as opposed to
simply disregarded, the boundary line between the commerce power and
the reserved power of the states.138

The expressio unius argument is even more strained in its application to
semisubstantive rules derived from the Bill of Rights. The whole point of
the constitutional amendments, after all, is to alter the effect of the original
Constitution. It follows that semisubstantive rules fairly derived from the
Bill of Rights—such as the findings-and-study rule of Reno v. ACLU139—
necessarily supersede whatever inferences one might otherwise draw from
Articles I through VI. At the least, the trumping effect of the amendments
should not give way to attenuated inferences drawn from sources as far
removed in subject matter as the Treaty and Impeachment Clauses.140

138. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1363–64 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’d, 514 U.S. 549
(1995); see also David S. Bogen, The Hunting of the Shark: An Inquiry into the Limits of
Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 187, 198
(1972) (anticipating and arguing for such a findings requirement “where the relationship of
the law to interstate commerce is not readily apparent,” and reasoning that this requirement
“could assist in focusing Congressional concern on the proper issues”). Indeed, the text of
the U.S. Constitution itself provides some basis for reaching the same conclusion. The law
in Lopez, and others like it, after all, can be constitutional only if they are “necessary and
proper for carrying into [e]xecution” the commerce power. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. It
is not self-evident that a law—and particularly a law that bears no plain relation to
commerce—constitutes a “proper” exercise of the commerce power when Congress itself
has not identified the connection to commerce on which its assertion of authority purportedly
rests.
139. 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (discussed supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text).
140. Another text-based critique of subjecting Congress to semisubstantive rules directed
at federal lawmakers (or at least to some of these rules) stems from the Constitution’s
injunction that “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 5, cl. 2. As Professors Christopher Bryant and Timothy Simeone have written, “[t]he
Supreme Court has long read the Rules and Journal Clauses as providing Congress broad
discretion to determine how to report and record its consideration of proposed legislation.”
Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 376; see also Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 417 (noting,
but rejecting, this argument); cf. Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional
Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 366 (2004) (describing the Rules of Proceedings Clause
as “in effect, a delegation of rule-designing authority from constitutional framers in the
initial period to legislators in subsequent periods”). The answer to this suggestion is that
Congress’s rulemaking powers, like all of its powers, are limited by the Bill of Rights and
other applicable constitutional inhibitions. What if, for example, the House issued a “rule”
for its “proceedings” that barred speeches from the floor except when made by white,
protestant males in support of policies favored by the President? This rule would be invalid
because it offends constitutional inhibitions on government conduct that trump the rulemaking power. By symmetry of logic, if there are constitutional inhibitions that, in specified
areas, mandate semisubstantive doctrines, then those inhibitions must limit the rulemaking
power as well. Just as surely as the “plenary” commerce power, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824), is hemmed in by constitutional limitations derived from outside
Article I, Section 8, so too the congressional rulemaking power is hemmed in by
constitutional limits that spring from sources outside Article I, Section 5.
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B. Argument 2 (Counteroriginalist Nature): Semisubstantive Decision
Making Contravenes an “Originalist” Interpretive Approach
Is judicial recognition of semisubstantive rules consistent with the
specialized interpretive philosophy known as “originalism”? The proper
meaning of this term, and its rightful role in constitutional discourse, are
subjects well beyond the scope of this Article. There is reason to believe,
however, that many self-styled originalists might embrace some—if not
many—semisubstantive rules.
In The Federalist No. 81, for example, Alexander Hamilton asserted that
the Constitution should operate as “the standard of construction for the
laws”141 so as to guard against the operation of “unjust and partial”
enactments.142 These passages give support to constitutionally inspired
clear-statement rules of statutory interpretation. Early decision making by
the Supreme Court reflects this same process-sensitive approach.143
Sources from the founding period thus seem to endorse one prominent form
of semisubstantive constitutional decision making.
The Federalist does not speak of such phenomena as findings-based
review or constitutional “who” rules. It does, however, repeatedly
emphasize the centrality of the values that give rise to these doctrines. For
Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, a properly functioning republic did not require
“an unqualified compliasance to every sudden breese of passion, or to every
transient impulse” of popular majorities.144 To the contrary, “the
republican principle” embraced by the Framers “demands[] that the
deliberate sense of the community should govern the conduct” of
government.145 For this reason, elected representatives were to give
legislative proposals “cool and sedate reflection” so that “temporary
delusion”146 and “momentary inclination”147—including those resulting
from “cabals of the representative body”148—would not find their way into
binding enactments. Of particular importance, the judiciary had a key role
to play in “guard[ing] the constitution and the rights of individuals from . . .
ill humours . . . [of] the people themselves . . . which, though they speedily
give place to better information and more deliberate reflection, have a
tendency in the mean time to occasion dangerous innovations in the
government, and serious oppressions of the minor party.”149 The
overarching message of these materials is loud and clear:
141. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 543 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
142. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 141, at 528.
143. See infra notes 152–54, 191, 333 and accompanying text.
144. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 141, at 482. The words
“passion” and “passions” appear in The Federalist sixty-six times and never in a
complimentary light. THE FEDERALIST CONCORDANCE 390–91 (Thomas S. Engeman et al.
eds., 1988).
145. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 141, at 482 .
146. Id. at 482–83.
147. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 141, at 527.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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The oftener a measure is brought under examination, the greater the
diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be
the danger of those errors which flow from want of due deliberation, or of
those mis[s]teps which proceed from the contagion of some common
passion or interest.150

Some originalists might find little support for semisubstantive rules in
passages of this ilk. Their point would be that, while deliberationenhancement was an aim of the Framers, there is no evidence that they
intended to promote this goal with semisubstantive judicial interventions.
This line of reasoning, however, may give too little weight to the original
understanding that courts would extrapolate rules from underlying
constitutional premises.151 In its seminal decision in McCulloch v.
Maryland,152 for example, the Court concluded that a state could not tax the
National Bank by relying on values of national autonomy “interwoven with
[the] web” of the Constitution.153 Notably, if Congress had clearly
authorized state taxation of federal banks in the wake of McCulloch, there
can be little doubt that the Court would have upheld this act of federal selfabnegation. McCulloch itself thus exemplifies semisubstantive decision
making in the form of a constitutionally inspired “common-law-like”
rule.154
There is another reason to question easy assumptions that
semisubstantive decision making runs afoul of an originalist outlook. As
Professor Sunstein has observed, “The Constitution doesn’t set out a theory
of interpretation; it doesn’t announce that judges must follow the original

150. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 141, at 495. Some
commentators have reflected on these passages in ways that lend support to semisubstantive
rules. In particular, such rules might well insulate legislators “from popular reaction for a
period of time sufficient to change public opinion for the better without denying the public’s
ultimate right to judge.” Sotirios A. Barber, Judicial Review and The Federalist, 55 U. CHI.
L. REV. 836, 845 (1988); see also Milner S. Ball, Judicial Protection of Powerless
Minorities, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1059, 1069 (1974) (describing the Court’s role as largely one of
“produc[ing] an intermediate stop which would allow an opportunity for reason and justice
to reassert themselves,” and quoting Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr. to describe judicial
review as a “‘device to appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober’” (quoting Charles E.
Wyzanski, Jr., Book Review, 57 HARV. L. REV. 389, 393 (1944))). A classic treatment of the
centrality of “deliberative democracy,” including its roots in the Framers’ thinking, is CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993). See id. at 21–23 (discussing connection of
this outlook to The Federalist). For an earlier effort of mine to develop linkages between
semisubstantive decision making and “the discernible purposes and aspirations of the
Founders themselves,” see Coenen, supra note 7, at 1867–69.
151. For an early example of this style of extrapolation-based decision making, see Ex
parte Craig, 6 F. Cas. 710, 710–11 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1827) (No. 3321) (Washington, Circuit J.)
(rejecting governmental power to seize money from accused counterfeiter because of risk
that resulting lack of funds would interfere with the accused’s ability to exercise Sixth
Amendment rights to counsel and to secure witnesses).
152. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
153. Id. at 426.
154. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.

COENEN FINAL

2860

4/26/2009 8:59:52 PM

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

understanding.”155 This point raises a profound question: where does
originalism itself come from? The answer to this question is complicated,
but one element of that answer seems clear: defenders of the originalist
methodology argue that it best comports with a proper focus on majoritarian
decision making in a self-governing republic. As Robert Bork has
articulated the point, a “philosophy of originalism” is defensible because it
provides “the only approach that can make judicial review democratically
legitimate.”156 In other words, nonoriginalist styles of interpretation are
properly rejected because they effectively permit unelected judges to wield
nondemocratic judgment in whatever field they choose to occupy.
If the value of preserving democratic self-government is a proper
touchstone for evaluating styles of judicial review—as Judge Bork’s
defense of originalism seems to suggest—the case for semisubstantive
review may gain substantial force. The entire thrust of semisubstantive
doctrines, after all, is to leave final decision-making authority in the hands
of Congress and other democratically accountable institutions.157 To be
sure, these rules call on political decision makers to exercise heightened
levels of care when they enter constitutional danger zones. But the essential
role of the doctrines is to refine and focus, rather than to frustrate and
defeat, democratic decision making.158
155. Cass R. Sunstein, Fighting for the Supreme Court: How Right-Wing Judges Are
Transforming the Constitution, HARPER’S MAG., Sept. 1, 2005, at 31, 36. Professor Sunstein
might add that if originalism itself is not reflected in the Constitution’s text, then it has
legitimacy only if it can be properly extrapolated from extratextual premises and values. But
if originalism is properly extrapolated from extratextual premises and values, then why not
semisubstantive doctrines? In particular, why should courts not find merit in such doctrines
given the deep original commitment to deliberative republican decision making that these
doctrines seek to foster? See supra notes 143–50 and accompanying text.
156. Robert H. Bork, Slouching Towards Miers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2005, at A12.
157. See infra notes 326–28 and accompanying text.
158. In any event, even if use of semisubstantive rules somehow threatens the value of
democratic self-government, it certainly does so no more than the many hard-and-fast rules
of constitutional law triggered by the originalist method. This is all the more true because
even leading originalists acknowledge that their methodology will not provide clear answers
in many cases because judges must inevitably extract from historical materials “the
principles the ratifiers understood themselves” and then “apply those principles to
unforeseen circumstances.” Bork, supra note 156. One difficulty is that constitutional
“principles” can be identified at many levels of generality. Critics of originalism say, for
example, that originalists must reject the Court’s canonical decision in Brown v. Board of
Education because the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment had no intention to end school
segregation. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 95, at 64. Some originalists respond by saying that
those ratifiers simultaneously embraced the broader goal of achieving racial equality and that
this more general goal should not be defeated by embracing a subprinciple that permits
school segregation. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 81–82 (1990). This response, of course, illustrates the need for the
exercise of judicial judgment in defining constitutional principles and in determining how
clashing principles are to be reconciled. No less important, applying originalist principles to
unforeseen conditions is in its nature a judgment-laden business. (If, for example, the
Fourteenth Amendment, in keeping with its text, embodies a principle of equality that
extends beyond race discrimination, might it not be that that principle should outlaw
government discrimination based on sexual orientation if “unforeseen conditions” suggest
that sexual orientation, like race, is genetically determined?) In short, originalist decision
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The bottom line is that, if one genuinely seeks a constitutional
methodology that celebrates democratic decision making, it is hard to see
why the semisubstantive approach does not fill the bill.159 In short, the
semisubstantive technique, with its emphasis on facilitating majoritarian
involvement in the reification of constitutional values, may be seen as
fundamentally compatible with the same goal of democratic selfgovernance that underlies in large measure the “originalist” stance.
C. Argument 3 (Unprincipledness): Semisubstantive Rules Are Ill-Advised
Because They Are Not Cabined by Principle and Thus Are Subject to
Judicial Abuse
In his opinion in Thompson, Justice Scalia suggested that Justice
O’Connor’s approach to that case, and by implication other semisubstantive
approaches as well, are inherently unprincipled.160 This sort of argument,

making permits judges to displace many programs implemented by democratically chosen
decision makers through the exercise of judicial translation. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that government use of modern heat-sensing to gather
information within a home is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). For
this reason, the originalist methodology carries its own threat of judicial innovation and
countermajoritarian results. And because originalist rulings are often hard-and-fast, the
innovations and results that originalism triggers may well have more antidemocratic effects
than outcomes produced by semisubstantive rules.
159. As Professor Burt Neuborne has observed,
While critics of process-based review have correctly noted that the judiciary, in
identifying the required process, makes covert value judgments only slightly less
profound than those more openly expressed by substantive-review courts, genuine
process-based judicial review nonetheless poses a lesser challenge to democratic
political theory. To the extent that process-based review requires normative
judgments, they are prior judgments about who should make a choice and how it
should be made, rather than the ad hoc substitution of a judge’s substantive
choices for those of the majority. Additionally, in many—perhaps most—settings,
the impact of process-based review will be merely to remand an issue to one or
another democratic forum for reconsideration in a procedurally correct manner.
As such, it casts a suspensive veto that slows, but does not derail, majority will.
Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United States,
57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 366 (1982); see also Calabresi, supra note 21, at 136 (“Requiring a
second look would not . . . amount to imposing the judge’s elite moral values on the polity
. . . . In reality the only values imposed are constitutionally grounded ones that . . . require
the legislature to speak openly and thoughtfully when rights are at stake.”); Harry H.
Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 505 (1982) (“Far from
foreclosing legislative choices, therefore, these doctrines shape the process by which
legislative goals may be achieved.”).
160. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 874–78 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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long a feature of constitutional discourse,161 centers on the indeterminacy of
legal doctrine162 and resulting opportunities for judicial excess.163
With good reason, rule-of-law concerns sometimes steer courts away
from pliable doctrines in favor of “bright line” rules.164 There is, however,
a countertendency in our law. In the service of substantive constitutional
values, courts often embrace doctrines that engender uncertainty and require
elaboration in later rulings.165 Our greatest jurists have recognized the need
for courts to apply rules driven by “considerations of degree.”166 No less
important, the Framers themselves emphasized the inevitability that
constitutional doctrine would take shape over time as courts built judicial
precedent upon judicial precedent in keeping with the common-law
tradition.167 In short, any “unprincipledness” attack leveled against
semisubstantive rules turns on a principle of principledness that itself is
marked by significant indeterminacy.
Beyond this, critics may be gazing from the wrong vantage point if they
seek to find one clear principle that unifies all of the Court’s
semisubstantive jurisprudence. After years of looking, most of us would
say that there is no grand theory of constitutional law.168 And if there is no
161. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 521 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)
(“The adoption of such a loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws
unconstitutional, if ever it is finally achieved, will amount to a great unconstitutional shift of
power to the courts which I believe and am constrained to say will be bad for the courts and
worse for the country.”).
162. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 614 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the “legislative process requirement” in the Commerce Clause context that
“would function . . . under standards never expressed and more or less arbitrarily applied”).
163. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 878 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling Justice O’Connor’s
approach a “Solomonic solution” but emphasizing that “Solomon . . . was not subject to the
constitutional constraints of the judicial department of a national government in a federal,
democratic system”); see also Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 392 (noting that certain
semisubstantive approaches do not offer “judicially manageable standards” and offer
“maximum flexibility for the Supreme Court . . . [that] would clearly be subject to judicial
abuse”).
164. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (Brennan J., dissenting)
(claiming the majority is “formulating an arbitrary ‘bright-line’ rule” to deal with automobile
searches); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (“[T]he Warrant Clause places
the line at the point where the property to be searched comes under the exclusive dominion
of police authority.”).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273–76 (2002) (rejecting court of
appeals’ attempts to “‘clearly delimit’” officers’ consideration of factors in investigatory
stop in favor of admittedly “abstract” totality-of-circumstances test (quoting United States v.
Arvizu, 232 F.3d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 2000))).
166. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935)
(Cardozo, J., concurring).
167. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 141, at 529
(describing the “considerable bulk” of judicial precedent that will have to be developed); see
also David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112
YALE L.J. 1717, 1729 (2003) (asserting that “[t]o a large extent our constitutional law has . . .
becom[e] a common law system in which cases are decided on the basis of precedents”).
168. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 1331, 1332 (1988) (“Constitutional law needs no grand theoretical foundation. None is
likely ever to be forthcoming, and none is desirable.”); Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in
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grand theory of constitutional law, there probably can be no grand theory of
semisubstantive constitutional law either. Why should there be? To date,
different semisubstantive rules have emerged in different areas of law to
address different needs. Federalism-driven clear-statement rules,169 for
example, compensate for the Court’s nearly unwavering unwillingness to
declare that acts of Congress reach beyond the commerce power.170 Socalled “Carolene groups” clear-statement rules respond to the Framers’
concerns about factional oppression of vulnerable minorities.171 And the
“why” rule of Hunter reflects the fundamental Fourteenth Amendment goal
of stemming state-sponsored oppression of racial minorities.172
To be sure, a skeptic might cite this clutter of rules as reflecting the very
problem Justice Scalia touched on in Thompson—namely, that
semisubstantive safeguards can become a “loose cannon” in the hands of
judges too ready to aim and fire.173 There are two parts to this worry—first,
that courts might profligately erect semisubstantive rules all over the
constitutional map,174 and second, that courts might apply any particular
In
semisubstantive rule in an unpredictable, overreaching way.175
Thompson itself, for example, Justice Scalia voiced concern that courts
might, on Justice O’Connor’s rationale, countenance imposition of the
death penalty only if it were mandated by public referenda, two-thirds
majority legislative votes, or the enactment of “bills printed in 10-point
type.”176
These concerns, though understandable, do not undermine
semisubstantive decision making.
As to the worry about judicial
Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1753, 1766 (1994) (“What theory could
possibly provide a persuasive and coherent rationale for the entire body of American
constitutional law as well as provide persuasive guidance for all future cases?”); Paul E.
McGreal, Ambition’s Playground, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1108 (2000) (“Indeed, a
rejection of grand constitutional theory can be inferred from aspects of the Constitution’s
structure and history.”).
169. See supra notes 34–42 and accompanying text (discussing Solid Waste Agency v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)).
170. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463–64 (1991). See generally Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (asserting that primary check on
Commerce Clause power should and does lie in the operation of the national political
process).
171. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., supra note 33, at 352–55 (discussing interpretive
canons favoring Native Americans).
172. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text (discussing Hunter v. Underwood,
471 U.S. 222 (1985)).
173. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 877 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. See Calabresi, supra note 21, at 105 n.71 (describing criticism of Professor Bickel
for advocating a judicial role that would too often allow judges to use legislative remands).
175. See Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 392 (stating semisubstantive rules “would
clearly be subject to judicial abuse”); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 143 (attacking
semisubstantive rules as a “mode of review that defies predictability, provides minimal
guidance to future courts and litigants, and . . . places judges in the position of secondguessing judgments of the political branches”); Frickey & Smith, supra note 11, at 1723–26
(expressing concern about inability of Congress to anticipate the highly exacting findingsbased rule of Garrett).
176. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 875–76.
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profligacy, it is no criticism to say that the Court has erected many
semisubstantive rules if those rules advance constitutional values in a
legitimate way. That structural rules often perform such work is suggested
by the fact that the adoption and application of such rules often stir little or
no opposition. Hunter was the product of a unanimous Court.177 So was
Reno v. ACLU178 and the relevant section of the Court’s dial-a-porn
decision in Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC.179 That the rules of these
cases are simultaneously semisubstantive and uncontroversial suggests that
abandoning them—and especially abandoning them wholesale—might well
do more harm than good.
As to concerns about the overreaching character of particular
semisubstantive doctrines, claimed reasons for castigation seem even more
strained. Justice Scalia’s handwringing about the risk of typeface-size and
supermajority-voting rules, for example, misses a key point. Not one of the
semisubstantive doctrines that the Court actually has recognized imposes
any numerically driven procedural requirement of this sort.180 No less
important, to those of us who are looking, such a requirement does not loom
on the constitutional horizon. Justice Scalia might respond that this
historical pattern is inconsequential. Rather, to borrow from Hamlet, the
principle is the thing,181 and the problem is that there is no way to forge a
workable doctrine that logically distinguishes permissible from
impermissible semisubstantive interventions.
This criticism is itself subject to criticism on the ground that the level of
predictability it demands is lacking in many fields of constitutional law.182
Put another way, if courts are willing to use open-textured approaches in
nonsemisubstantive decision making, it is hard to see why a similar play in
the joints is intolerable when courts use semisubstantive rules. In United
States v. Lopez,183 for example, the Court found that Congress had
overreached its commerce power by regulating a “noncommercial” subject,
177. Hunter, 471 U.S. 222; see also supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text.
178. 521 U.S. 844 (1997); see also supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
179. 492 U.S. 115 (1989); see also supra note 68 and accompanying text. Notably,
Justice Scalia wrote separately in Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC to emphasize that
“[n]either due process nor the First Amendment requires legislation to be supported by
committee reports, floor debates, or even consideration, but only by a vote.” 492 U.S. at 133
(Scalia, J., concurring). No other member of the Court signed on to this disclaimer.
180. See Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 381 (conceding that “it would be foolish for a court
to tell Congress that it must always hold at least one hour of floor debate for every proposal
under consideration”).
181. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 2, sc. 2 (“[T]he
play’s the thing.”).
182. Of course, Justice Scalia has been known to lament the lack of predictability in
various areas of constitutional law. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398–99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (collecting opinions
criticizing the Lemon test). In general, however, his pleas have not carried the day. See, e.g.,
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining that
the Court was improvising “constitutional structure on the basis of currently perceived
utility”).
183. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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notwithstanding four dissenters’ insistence that this governing principle was
too opaque.184 The majority, in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia,
responded that,
Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is
commercial or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal
uncertainty. But, so long as Congress’ authority is limited to those
powers enumerated in the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated
powers are interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits,
congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause always will
engender “legal uncertainty.” . . . The Constitution mandates this
uncertainty . . . .185

Indeterminacy, in short, is rampant in constitutional law. Given this reality,
it hardly seems right to single out semisubstantive rules for critique on
indeterminacy grounds.
In any event, the field of semisubstantive rules is not devoid of limiting
principles—and this is true whether one looks at those rules in joint or
several fashion. In many semisubstantive decisions, the Court has worked
hard to identify confining elements of decision. In Gregory v. Ashcroft,186
for example, the Court deemed the Federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act inapplicable to state judges by applying a semisubstantive
federalism-driven super-clear-statement rule of statutory interpretation; in
doing so, however, the Court took pains to link that rule to those state
“political functions” already made the subject of special judicial deference
in preexisting alienage-discrimination rulings.187 In Mow Sun Wong188 the
Court again drew on this “political functions” principle—normally of
significance in evaluating state alienage-based discrimination—in applying
a constitutional “who” rule to a federal ban on hiring noncitizens.189 One
might decry the “political functions” principle applied in these cases as
unduly loosey-goosey.
Such an attack, however, does not target
semisubstantive rules; instead it takes aim at a principle developed long ago
as the Court forged constitutional doctrine to deal with alienage-based
discrimination.190 To say that semisubstantive rules are unprincipled
because preexisting doctrinal categories are unprincipled is to offer no
criticism properly directed at semisubstantive rules themselves.

184. Id. at 551; id. at 627–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 566 (majority opinion).
186. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
187. Id. at 461–63 (“This plain statement rule is . . . an acknowledgement that the States
retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme. . . . These [alienagediscrimination] cases stand in recognition of the authority . . . of the States to determine
qualifications of their most important government officials.”).
188. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
189. Id. at 102–03 & 102 n.22.
190. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 73–74 (1979) (permitting exclusion of aliens
from position of public school teacher on political function grounds); Foley v. Connelie, 435
U.S. 291, 298–99 (1978) (permitting exclusion of aliens from state police force under this
same principle).
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Other limiting principles operate in this field. One is that legislative
ambiguity properly justifies the use of constitutionally driven clearstatement rules, just as surely as it brings into play any number of other
rules of statutory interpretation.191 In recent years, leading scholars have
shown that many rules of statutory construction advance “public values.”192
Against this backdrop, it seems entirely sensible that the Court has forged
interpretive rules distinctively responsive to those public values that are
constitutional in character.
Apart from clear-statement rules, the Court has brought semisubstantive
analysis to bear primarily in cases that involve fundamental rights or
suspect classifications.193 A quick protest might be lodged that these terms
are so amorphous that they do not supply a meaningful constraint. These
terms, however, have preexisting meanings in our law, even if those
meanings may be shadowy at the edges.194 Again, the key point is that any
challenge to a fundamental-rights/suspect-classification limit on
semisubstantive rules is not an attack on semisubstantive rules themselves;
instead, it is an attack on doctrinal concepts long recognized outside the
semisubstantive-safeguards realm.195
What is more, the Court has signaled that this fundamentalrights/suspect-classification limitation does have a confining effect. In
United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,196 the Court refused to
endorse a strong semisubstantive challenge directed at a fluky federal
statute that resulted from congressional misunderstandings triggered by
self-serving interest group misrepresentations.197 The Court took a handsoff approach to the case, even in the face of severe process problems,
because the challenge was mounted under only the minimal-scrutiny prong
of equal-protection analysis.198 In other words, the Court forewent a
semisubstantive invalidation—despite powerful pleas for a process191. See, e.g., Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of
Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 384–85 (2003) (discussing and applying noscitur a sociis and
ejusdem generis); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 793 n.9 (1995)
(discussing maxim of expressio unius); United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556,
564–65 (1845) (stating rule of in pari materia and explaining its use where legislative
language is unclear).
192. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989) (exploring the role public values play in statutory
interpretation); David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 921 n.1 (1992) (collecting literature); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989) (proposing a set of
interpretive norms designed to promote goals of deliberative government).
193. See supra notes 129–34 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (describing
intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications).
195. See supra notes 124–34 and accompanying text.
196. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
197. See id. at 189–93 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (positing that challenged legislation was,
among other things, supported by misstatements that were “frequent and unrebutted”).
198. Id. at 175 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Court in cases involving social and economic
benefits has consistently refused to invalidate on equal protection grounds legislation which
it simply deemed unwise or unartfully drawn.”).
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remedying intervention—because no “fundamental constitutional right” or
“suspect” classification was in view.199
The Court not only has developed principles that limit the settings in
which semisubstantive rules operate; it also has suggested principles that
restrict the permissible nature of procedural requirements imposed by these
doctrines. To return to Justice Scalia’s dissent in Thompson, all of the
semisubstantive safeguards the Court has recognized to date are far
removed from the imposition of a two-thirds-vote requirement (an approach
that would undermine, rather than reinforce, the basic principle of majority
rule); a popular-referendum requirement (an approach that would engender
both disruptive delay and heightened cost in violation of the Madisonian
emphasis on representative government);200 or a ten-point-type requirement
for proposed bills (an approach that smacks of hypertechnicality and
inattention to actual levels of legislative care).
In essence, the
semisubstantive rules actually fashioned by the Court focus on forcing
policymakers to use decision-making procedures (like preenactment study,
sunset-like requirements, or budgeted spending) (1) that policymakers
frequently utilize anyway, (2) that are widely recognized as playing a
valuable deliberation-enhancing role, and (3) that operate within the
overarching context of representative and majoritarian decision making. In
addition, the Court has required special procedures, primarily (if not only)
in instances where they operate to serve a particular constitutional end in a
plainly logical way.201
Finally, semisubstantive invalidations do not tie the policymaker’s hands
forever, or even for a single day. Rather, these doctrines in their nature
invite an override by the political branches of what is, by definition, only a
provisional judicial ruling.202 Those who attack semisubstantive rules as
unprincipled must recognize and respond to their self-limiting character.
The key point is clear: constitutional doctrines that give political
officials—rather than judicial officials—the last word on how to resolve
hotly contested constitutional questions seem distinctly undeserving of
labels such as unconstrained, uncontrollable, and overreaching.203
199. Id. at 174–75.
200. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 141, at 62–65.
201. See, e.g., supra notes 39–42, 141–42, 169–70, 186–87 and accompanying text
(discussing clear-statement rule designed to protect federalism values that otherwise might
receive too little judicial protection).
202. See, e.g., supra notes 97, 115 and accompanying text (describing reactions to
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972)).
203. See, e.g., Kent Roach, Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the
Supreme Court and Canadian Legislatures, 80 CANADIAN B. REV. 481, 532 (2001)
(suggesting that a “dialogic approach” to constitutional decision making “diminishes perhaps
to the point of evaporation” the tension between democracy and judicial review). Indeed,
there is much to be said for just the opposite idea—namely, that semisubstantive rules serve
a critical purpose by summoning political decision makers, and the people themselves, to
participate actively in the elaboration of constitutional restraints. See, e.g., NEAL DEVINS &
LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 229 (2004) (arguing against judicial
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D. Argument 4 (Intrusiveness): Semisubstantive Rules—As Both a
Practical and an Historical Matter—Are Unduly Invasive and Disdainful of
Legislative Autonomy Because They Interfere Directly with Legislative
Processes
Justice Scalia attacked Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Thompson not only
because he saw it as inviting an unpredictable variety of judicial
interventions, but also because he feared it would promote judicial
“interference in the States’ legislative processes, the heart of their
sovereignty.”204 The Oklahoma legislature, he reasoned, “must in the
future legislate in the manner that we say.”205 In his view, this processcentered approach was “more disdainful” of “States’ rights” than even the
hard-and-fast substantive-result-centered approach of the Thompson
plurality.206 Others have voiced similar concerns.207 In his dissent in the
Lopez case,208 for example, Justice Souter wrote that “review [of
congressional enactments] for deliberateness would be as patently
unconstitutional as an Act of Congress mandating long opinions from this
Court.”209
There is something to these concerns. As early as 1810, in Fletcher v.
Peck,210 the Supreme Court declared that “the invalidity of a law cannot be
questioned because undue influence may have been used in obtaining it.”211
monopoly in constitutional interpretation on the ground that, under such a system, the people
will not accept the authority of the Constitution or of judicial interpretations of it); id. at
237–38 (emphasizing value of colloquies with regard to constitutional meaning); Daniel A.
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 926
(1987) (“‘[D]ue process of lawmaking’ has the potential to strengthen the democratic
process.”).
204. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 877 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 848 (4th
Cir. 1999), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (“[A] judicial
mandate that Congress construct a proper paper trail . . . [would] ill befit the dignity of the
Legislature.”); Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 382 (noting that the “Court has held that
judicial intrusion into congressional procedures is inconsistent with the constitutional
commitment to legislative independence” even when faced with credible evidence of
legislative abuse); see also Colker & Brudney, supra note 30, at 142 (arguing that new
legislative record rules will create “combative relationship between Congress and the
States”); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common
Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1153 (1978) (“[T]he constitutional common law might well
precipitate a clash of will between Congress and the Court. Far from reducing friction, the
proposal seems calculated to increase it.”).
208. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
209. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 614 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also
Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 370 (identifying “significant separation-of-powers concerns, as
well as practical concerns about the consequences of subjecting the flexible lawmaking
process to the rigid judicial process”).
210. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
211. Id. at 123. See generally 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 194 (1998) (“[I]f a
statute appears on its face to be constitutional and valid, courts will not inquire into the
motives of the legislature, or influence brought to bear to secure enactment of a statute.”
(footnote omitted)).
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Building on this notion, American courts generally have eschewed the
invalidation of legislative actions on the process-based grounds that they
resulted from “fraud, bribery and corruption.”212 In a like vein, following
the lead of Field v. Clark,213 many courts have shied away from policing
legislative adherence to internal procedures through use of the so-called
“enrolled-bill rule.”214 The thrust of these doctrines is to immunize statutes
from invalidation on the ground that they spring from tainted legislative
processes. Arguing by analogy, Justice Scalia and analysts like him might
well assert that semisubstantive doctrines violate a strong tradition of
judicial noninterference in the internal operations of political decision
makers.
Advocates of this position, however, must confront a difficulty that
Justice Scalia himself has highlighted in other settings—namely, the
difficulty of identifying the proper level of generality at which to describe
the relevant tradition. In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,215 Justice Scalia staked
the claim that, at least in some contexts, traditions are best characterized at
their greatest level of specificity.216 Building on this thinking, the tradition
reflected in the fraud-and-bribery principle and the enrolled-bill rule does
not extend to semisubstantive doctrines for at least two reasons. First,
semisubstantive doctrines—in contrast to the rules of Fletcher and Field—
focus on vindicating particular text-based substantive constitutional
guaranties.217 Second, semisubstantive rules seek to vindicate these
guarantees in ways distinctively responsive to the particular constitutional
values at stake.218 For these reasons, semisubstantive rules do not involve a
212. Lynn v. Polk, 76 Tenn. 121, 293 (1881).
213. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
214. The enrolled-bill rule,
provides that an act ratified by the presiding officers of the legislature, approved
by the [executive], and enrolled in the proper . . . office is conclusively presumed
to have been properly passed, and such an act is not subject to impeachment by
evidence outside the act as enrolled to show it was not passed in compliance with
law.
73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 44 (2001); see Field, 143 U.S. at 668–73 (holding that even if an
enrolled bill omits portions of legislation actually passed by both houses of Congress,
signature by the President and leaders of both houses renders the statute unimpeachable);
Williams v. MacFeeley, 197 S.E. 225, 228–29 (Ga. 1938) (applying rule); Commonwealth v.
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 170 S.W. 171, 172 (Ky. 1914) (same). Some jurisdictions follow a less
restrictive but still deferential approach known as the “journal entry rule.” Under this view
the enrolled bill acts as prima facie evidence of the regular enactment, but the courts are
permitted to have recourse to the legislative journals in order to ascertain whether the law
has been passed in accordance with constitutional requirements. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes §
43 (2001); see also, e.g., Amos v. Moseley, 77 So. 619, 621 (Fla. 1917) (applying rule).
215. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
216. Id. at 127 n.6 (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
217. In contrast, more general procedural requirements apply to all legislation. See United
States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 4 (1892) (refusing to look behind legislative journals to
determine whether speaker had properly counted quorum as reflected in journals); Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669 (1892) (rejecting, on enrolled-bill principles, argument that statute
that omitted a section actually passed by both houses of Congress did not become law by the
President’s signature).
218. See supra notes 32–116, 123 and accompanying text.
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license for courts to police the honesty, integrity, and professionalism of
legislatures in a free-form, across-the-board way.219 The principles of
Fletcher and Field thus bear in only the most generalized manner on the
normative claims of semisubstantive constitutional rules.
In addition, while the fraud-or-bribery and enrolled-bill-rule decisions
represent a tradition of judicial noninterference with legislative
processes,220 there is a deep-rooted countertradition in our law. The case
for motive-based analysis, for example, reaches as far back as McCulloch v.
Maryland.221 So too with “constitutional . . . common-law-like rules”222
that find expression not only in McCulloch223 but in well-aged dormant
Commerce Clause decisions as well.224 Clear statement rules were invoked
during the era of Chief Justice Marshall,225 and constitutional sunset
doctrines surfaced as early as the 1930s.226 More fundamentally, the entire
theory of representation-reinforcement review, which has long pervaded our
constitutional discourse, focuses on “the process by which the laws that
govern society are made.”227 And, both the Supreme Court and other courts
have found constitutional violations based on the process, rather than the
content, of legislative action on many occasions.228
219. See Brest, supra note 79, at 101 (“In Fletcher the question that the Court refused to
ask was: what did the decisionmakers desire to achieve in terms of personal benefits (for
example, lining their pockets) by the act of voting? The inquiry [in “why” rule cases] bears
closer resemblance to the traditional search for legislative purpose as an aid to statutory
interpretation: what effects did the decisionmakers desire to achieve by the operation of
their decision? These inquiries differ functionally as well as formally, for the methods for
proving corruption entail a judicial intrusion into the political processes that is largely absent
in the latter inquiry.”).
220. See, e.g., Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 376–78 (pointing to Field as evidence
that the Court has traditionally stayed clear of intruding into Congress’s legislative process).
221. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 387 (1819) (suggesting recognition of a judicial duty to
intervene when Congress invokes an enumerated power as a “pretext” to regulate local
matters); see also Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 367–68 (1915) (invalidating facially
neutral law with regard to literacy tests on the ground that its purpose was to disenfranchise
African Americans).
222. Coenen, supra note 7, at 1735–55; see also Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court
1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1975).
223. See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (overturning
pilotage penalty for foreign vessels). See generally supra notes 16–20.
225. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.)
(“[W]here fundamental principles are overthrown . . . the legislative intention must be
expressed with irresistible clearness . . . .”).
226. See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1709, 1721–26 (discussing time-tied second-look
doctrines and constitutional sunset rules, including those discussed in Home Building &
Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)).
227. ELY, supra note 8, at 74.
228. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954–55 (1983) (invalidating one-House
congressional veto as noncompliant with Article I bicameralism and presentment
requirements); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189–91 (1978) (refusing to find
repeal of substantive legislation by subsequent appropriations legislation, and considering
House and Senate rules declaring out of order any provision of appropriations legislation that
changes existing law); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 550 (1969) (holding that
Congress used improper procedures to exclude a representative); Gojack v. United States,
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If the tradition-based attack on semisubstantive rules is subject to serious
criticism, so too is the companion pragmatic argument that these rules
intrude in an undue and disrespectful way on legislative autonomy.
Intrusiveness, of course, is in the eye of the beholder. To many beholders,
however, Justice Scalia was surely wrong to say that the structural approach
taken by Justice O’Connor in Thompson was more invasive with regard to
legislative integrity than the substantive approach taken by the Court’s
plurality.229 Under the plurality’s analysis, after all, Oklahoma had no
choice whatsoever. It could not—no matter what steps it took—choose to
execute fifteen-year-old offenders.230 Justice O’Connor, in contrast, gave
the state an option. To be sure, it was an unpleasant option from the
perspective of both the state and Justice Scalia. But it was an option.231
After Thompson, Oklahoma did not have to legislate in “the precise form”
spelled out by Justice O’Connor.232 It did not have to do anything. But if
the state wanted to reinstate capital punishment for fifteen-year-olds, Justice
O’Connor’s approach permitted it to try to do so, while the plurality’s
approach flatly foreclosed the effort. In these circumstances, there is every
reason to say that Justice O’Connor—contrary to Justice Scalia’s
objection—was following “an approach more respectful of States’ rights
than the plurality.”233
384 U.S. 702, 706–12 (1966) (finding that subcommittee conducted a legislative
investigation unauthorized by congressional rules); Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84,
87–88 (1949) (holding, in prosecution for perjury before House committee, that defendant
could raise lack of quorum as a defense); see also Linde, supra note 21, at 248 (“The
Supreme Court holds Congress to its own rules in the case of investigations.”). State courts
sometimes intervene on process-centered grounds as well—for example, by enforcing
constitutional provisions that require laws to deal with only one subject. See, e.g., Dep’t of
Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455, 459 (Fla. 1982) (describing state constitutional requirement
that certain appropriations laws contain provisions on no other subject). See generally Philip
P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and
United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695, 722 n.144 (1996) (“The single-subject
rule might seem mere formalism, but it could well have the useful effects of forcing the
legislature to place unrelated issues in separate bills, rather than combine them for logrolling
purposes.”); Millard H. Ruud, “No Law Shall Embrace More than One Subject,” 42 MINN.
L. REV. 389 (1958) (examining the single-subject rule).
229. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 877 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 838 (plurality opinion).
231. See id. at 857–59 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that this issue should be left to
the legislature).
232. Id. at 876. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 877; see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 551 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“A holding that the classification was not adequately preceded by a
consideration of less drastic alternatives or adequately explained by a statement of legislative
purpose would be far less intrusive than a final determination that the substance of the
decision is not ‘narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal.’”); id. at 552 (“[T]here can
be no separation-of-powers objection to a more tentative holding of unconstitutionality based
on a failure to follow procedures that guarantee the kind of deliberation that a fundamental
constitutional issue of this kind obviously merits.”); BICKEL, supra note 8, at 206 (describing
semisubstantive interventions and other “passive devices . . . as lesser rational alternatives to
an otherwise unavoidable principled judgment . . . because they work relatively no binding
interference with the democratic process”); Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L.
REV. 1065, 1109 (1998) (deeming motive-based semisubstantive review “‘intrinsically less
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More than six decades ago, Professors Alexander M. Bickel and Harry H.
Wellington made this same point, observing that “[a] candid avowal that a
matter . . . is being sent back for a second reading, so to speak, is much
more compatible with due respect for the peculiar powers and competencies
of both [legislative and judicial] institutions,”234 than an irreversible, hardand-fast invalidation of the challenged law. The key point is that
semisubstantive decision making has a built-in self-limiting quality. As we
have seen, the Court often employs rules that conclusively foreclose results
that elected policymakers want to reach.235 It seems strange to say that
these “look never again” rules interfere less with legislative integrity than
do “look again” rules that specifically invite legislative majorities to
overturn the judiciary’s action.
E. Argument 5 (Manipulability): Semisubstantive Rules Are Distinctively
Abusable Because Courts Can Manipulate Them to Achieve Substantive
Outcomes Without Seeming to Do So
A fifth argument against semisubstantive rules stems from concerns
about judicial opportunism. The fear is that these rules, when placed in the
hands of tactically-minded judges, “can sometimes be used as a subterfuge
to ‘rig’ a desired substantive outcome.”236 Professor Mark Tushnet has
expressed this worry in the following terms:
intrusive than substantive judicial review’” (quoting Paul Brest, Reflections on Motive
Review, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1141, 1143 (1978))); Linde, supra note 21, at 243 (“It is far
more cause for resentment to invalidate the substance of a policy that the politically
accountable branches and their constituents support than to invalidate a lawmaking
procedure that can be repeated correctly, yet we take substantive judicial review for
granted.”); see also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976) (skipping
“substantive” equal protection inquiry because a “narrower inquiry discloses that essential
procedures have not been followed”).
234. Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34–35 (1957).
235. See supra notes 7, 24 and accompanying text.
236. TRIBE, supra note 131, § 17-3, at 1686; see also Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30,
at 391–92 (expressing concern over obviously value-laden judgments hidden behind socalled procedural semisubstantive rulings); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 153
(“[J]udicial weighing of the adequacy of . . . legislative record . . . is vulnerable to politicized
application.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 636–37 (1992)
(noting “concern that the Court’s new canons represent a form of judicial activism that is
particularly questionable because it is backdoor” and that the Court may not have “avoided
the countermajoritarian difficulty . . . [but] only deepened it by engaging in under-the-table
constitutional lawmaking”); id. at 646 (fearing that “a lack of recognition and candor about
what the Court has done recently with quasi-constitutional law has submerged a variety of
hotly contestable normative and empirical issues” and expressing concern about “judicial
modesty cloaking judicial activism”); Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene
(McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory
Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CAL. L. REV. 397, 449 (2005) (“[T]he use of
the [avoidance] canon seems ripe for strategic judicial behavior based on the political
environment at the time the Court is deciding.”); id. at 446 (arguing that avoidance canon
“does not promote judicial restraint”); Richard Neely, Obsolete Statutes, Structural Due
Process, and the Power of Courts to Demand a Second Legislative Look, 131 U. PA. L. REV.
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In the real world of politics we can predict with great accuracy what the
effect of suspensory decisions will be. . . . Sometimes we can predict that
the statute will not be reenacted, in which case structural review has given
the reality of constraint on legislatures and the illusion of freedom for
legislatures to do what they want. Clever judges will invoke structural
review when they predict that the legislature will be unable to enact
legislation that contravenes the judges’ personal preferences; they will
invoke other modes of review in other cases.237

On its face, this passage suggests that semisubstantive rules may encourage
judicial mendacity—a serious problem in its own right. An even graver
problem involves the abuse of judicial power that this prevarication will
facilitate. If in fact “clever judges” often look to use constitutional law to
advance “personal preferences,” we may assume they are inhibited from
doing so primarily because the outright invalidation of laws risks intense
clashes with policy-making authorities.238 On Professor Tushnet’s analysis,
271, 281 (1982) (reviewing GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982)) (“The primary objection then to a ‘structural due process’ review power is that the
power will be used in an unprincipled way, by power-hungry judges, increasing in effect the
junta-like component of American government.”); Tushnet, supra note 123, at 2792 (noting
that provisional review may “degenerate into—or may be disguises for—strong-form
review”).
Related to concerns about judicial subterfuge is an argument that attacks the lack of
fair notice offered by semisubstantive rules. Professors Philip P. Frickey and Steven S.
Smith argue that “[t]he Court imposed these requirements retroactively . . . when Congress
had no notice of the necessity of generating a carefully crafted legislative history.” Frickey
& Smith, supra note 11, at 1723. Focusing on Garrett, they note that, even though “the
Court faced congressional findings of pervasive discrimination against the disabled and an
elaborate legislative history recounting instances of such discrimination,” it “applied to the
legislative history a . . . shredding technique, . . . in which the evidence was examined in
segmented fashion rather than for its cumulative impact.” Id. at 1725–26. Worse yet, the
Court would only accept evidence set forth in the official legislative history, id. at 1726,
while declining to look at even a highly informative task force report that was drafted at the
request of a House subcommittee, id. at 1735. In the same vein, Professors Ruth Colker and
James Brudney fault the Court for requiring Congress to effectively use a “crystal ball.”
Colker & Brudney, supra note 30, at 85. The Justices’ approach, they say, “effectively
penalizes the enacting Congress for failing to create a detailed legislative record, even
though such a record requirement could not reasonably have been anticipated at the moment
of legislative deliberation and enactment.” Id.; see also Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at
133 (arguing that the Court’s second-guessing of legislative procedural choices is
“particularly pernicious due to its failure to provide guidance on what legislative modes
would be found adequate”). At least three responses to these commentators are available:
(1) they seem to overlook the fact that judicial invalidation of legislation often occurs
pursuant to newly articulated constitutional rules, including when hard-and-fast judicial
decision making occurs; (2) they may overstate fair notice concerns because Congress can
always “play it safe” by anticipating serious process-based review (which, Congress—in
light of Garrett—surely should and will do in the future when acting pursuant to its
Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 power); and (3) these arguments do not seem to be
directed at semisubstantive rules in general (or not even at legislative findings rules in
general), but instead at only special applications of those rules, particularly in the Garrett
case.
237. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 211.
238. See ELY, supra note 8, at 47 (“Thus we are told that the Court’s ‘essentially antidemocratic character keeps it constantly in jeopardy of destruction’: it knows ‘that frequent
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judges might well sidestep this deterrent—while nonetheless achieving “the
reality of constraint”—by using semisubstantive rules to create “the illusion
of freedom for legislatures to do what they want.”239 These rules, in short,
threaten to operate as a sort of stealth bomber in the service of a powerful,
but otherwise pent-up, tendency toward judicial overreaching.240
Professor Tushnet’s stated concerns about judicial dissembling, and
expanded opportunities for judicial overreaching, are subject to challenge
on a variety of grounds. First, the argument seems to assume that judges
often misrepresent the actual reasoning behind their decisions. Many of us
will be skeptical of this view, for we believe that judges, by and large, are
both honest and committed to the essential features of the rule of law.241
To embrace this sanguine outlook is not to say that judges never act
strategically. It is only to say that most judges, most of the time, state their
reasons accurately in the written opinions on which they place their names.
And if this is so, there is limited cause for concern about “subterfuge” and
“illusion” effectuated by way of semisubstantive doctrines.
It is also doubtful, as the subterfuge argument seems to posit, that
semisubstantive doctrines are distinctively subject to judicial misuse.242 In
judicial intervention in the political process would generate such widespread political
reaction that the Court would be destroyed in its wake.’” (footnote omitted)).
239. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 211; see Schrock & Welsh, supra note 207, at 1125 (“It
is thus possible for a Court, animated by realism, to be constitutionally cautious but
subconstitutionally activist, even adventurist.”). Professors William Eskridge and Philip
Frickey have made a related point in discussing clear-statement rules of statutory
interpretation:
Because the Court sees itself as using up political capital every time it invalidates a
statute, it thinks twice about exercising judicial review. To the extent the Court
does not see itself as being “on the spot” when it interprets statutes, it may believe
it has more freedom to interpret statutes to thwart legislative expectations than it
does to strike them down.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 236, at 637.
240. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 613–14 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(identifying risk that findings requirements may be used as a “covert” form of merits-based
review). Christine Bateup makes a related argument. She says that, even if judges act
without manipulative intent, legislatures will often be unable to reinstate semisubstantively
invalidated rules “in practice” because of intervening changes in “political equilibrium” or
the “salience” of the issue presented. Bateup, supra note 23, at 1131; accord infra notes
249–51 and accompanying text. For this reason, she worries that these rules “entail unseen
democratic costs.” Bateup, supra note 23, at 1131. This argument, however, raises no
appreciable cause for worry. After all, it seems erroneous to say that the judiciary’s scuttling
of a law raises a “countermajoritarian difficulty” when a current legislative majority in fact
sees no need to reinstate it.
241. See, e.g., ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED
OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE A-3 (3d ed. 1997) (“We believe nearly all
judges try to give their ‘real’ reasons when writing opinions.”); Neil K. Komesar, Taking
Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 366, 397 (1984) (deeming it “an unestablished proposition” that “judges employed
institutional considerations cynically” in Mow Sun Wong and other cases).
242. At the least, it is open to question that they are uniquely or distinctively subject to
use in devious fashion to expand judicial power. See, e.g., Tribe, supra 21, at 284 n.47 (“It is
worth noting that even rules mechanically applicable carry their own risks for concealing
illegitimate bases for decision.”).
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particular, why should we expect potential critics to roll over if courts make
a manipulative mockery of these tools of decision? Indeed, those who
watch for overreaching by judges can decry not only judicial activism, but
the combination of judicial activism and judicial deception, if and when
judges pretend to pursue “the reality of constraint” in the sheep’s clothing
of semisubstantive decision making. Perhaps this is why there is no strong
evidence that courts in the past have used semisubstantive rules in
manipulative ways.
This absence of evidence may also reflect the powerful practical
disincentive for using semisubstantive rules if the real goal is to achieve
preferred substantive outcomes. The problem is that—despite Professor
Tushnet’s prognostications to the contrary—the strategic use of
semisubstantive doctrines “lacks reliability.”243 At the time of Furman v.
Georgia,244 for example, many thought that that decision, despite its
semisubstantive bent, spelled the end of the death penalty in this country.245
Their predictions, to put it mildly, proved inaccurate. Only four years after
Furman, the Court rejected Eighth Amendment attacks on the death penalty
after many state legislatures made careful reappraisals of their capital
sentencing schemes and reasserted the importance of this form of
punishment.246
Difficulties in predicting legislative reactions to provisional rulings are
heightened by the fact that the very cases in which courts employ
semisubstantive techniques—typically those cases that involve “suspect
classifications” or “fundamental rights”—often spark the highest levels of
political passion.247 Moreover, no one can suggest that semisubstantive

243. Tribe, supra note 131, § 17-3, at 1686; see also Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of
the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1964) (“[I]t is easy to misjudge or distort the impact of a Court
pronouncement, and guesses about that impact are treacherous sources of precepts for Court
behavior.”).
244. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
245. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 85, at 201 n.41 (“The Furman decision was
perceived by many to mean that no capital punishment statute . . . would be constitutionally
acceptable.”).
246. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See generally BICKEL, supra note 8, at 206 (“[T]here
are dozens of instances, in the federal context, of congressional reversal of the Court, and
many more instances of the most fruitful interplay between the Court and the legislature or
the executive, following colloquies initiated by the Justices.”).
247. For example, recent partial-birth-abortion litigation has involved hotly contested
issues regarding the constitutional right-to-choose principle first embraced in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), the Court invalidated
Nebraska’s partial-birth abortion law. Id. at 936–38. In a concurring opinion, Justice
O’Connor anticipated that legislatures could and would attempt to correct the deficiencies in
the Nebraska statute, and there was no suggestion that she was engaging in any subterfuge
when she made these remarks. See id. at 950–51 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In fact,
Congress quickly responded to Stenberg by enacting a national partial-birth-abortion law,
and the Court upheld this new legislation in part because Congress made new and explicit
findings about whether there was any medical need for the outlawed procedure. See
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rulings always lead to de facto invalidations; the near-immediate
resuscitation of the alien-hiring ban struck down in Mow Sun Wong (no less
than the aftermath of Furman) puts the lie to any such claim.248
Perhaps the greatest difficulty with the strategic-manipulability objection
is that it pays no heed to the passage of time. It may be—as Professor
Tushnet has claimed—that courts often can predict how a then-sitting
legislature will react to any particular semisubstantive invalidation. Even if
they can, however, political tides ebb and flow. As a result, any
semisubstantive invalidation is likely to achieve the desired substantive
outcome only if the composition of the then-sitting political body remains
unchanged. For this reason, a court interested in advancing its own
substantive agenda for anything more than the short term is likely to eschew
a semisubstantive approach.
The critic might respond to these observations by noting that politicalagenda-pursuing judges will use semisubstantive rulings because, even if
their prognostications of legislative acquiescence prove misplaced, they can
jump back in and knock out the reenacted program with an outright
substantive invalidation. There are too many practical difficulties with this
chain of reasoning, however, to believe that judges often use it. A program
reenacted after a semisubstantive invalidation, for example, may not
become the subject of a legal challenge for some time. If the strategicallyminded court is the Supreme Court, for example, any such challenge will
come before it (at least as an ordinary matter) only after years of processing
in subordinate tribunals. Whether the strategically-minded court is the
Supreme Court or a lower court, the passage of time often will generate new
judicial appointees (or a new set of panel members in the case of
intermediate appellate courts), who may well not share their predecessors’
substantive agendas.249 And even if a reenacted statute quickly finds its
way back to the same court that earlier had undone it on semisubstantive
grounds, a recent legislative endorsement undertaken in response to an
express judicial invitation hardly provides the ideal condition for an
outright judicial invalidation.250 Put another way, if a court (and
particularly, the Supreme Court) invites a dialogue with the political
branches, it had better be prepared to listen to the response it receives;

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165–66 (2007) (noting that Congress found medical
consensus that the procedure was never medically necessary).
248. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structural Review, and Prophecy, 8 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 809, 814 (1983) (“The Supreme Court is an enduring institution with a
regularly changing membership.”). The recent partial-birth-abortion decision, handed down
after Justice Alito replaced Justice O’Connor, helps to illustrate the point. See supra note
247.
250. See Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the
Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 610 (1983) (“[T]he courts need to remember that
confrontation with the policy-makers puts the delicate nature of the separation of powers to
great stress.”).
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otherwise, it risks endangering the goodwill on which all of its authority
ultimately depends.251
F. Argument 6 (Doctrinal Distortion): Semisubstantive Decision Making
Has the “Vice” of the “Passive Virtues” Because It Invites Distortion of
Otherwise-Useful Substantive Constitutional Doctrines
During the early 1960s, Professor Bickel made the case that the Supreme
Court should cleave to the “[p]assive [v]irtues,”252 working hard to avoid
head-on conflicts with the political branches over the constitutionality of
government programs.253 Methods for averting confrontation included
broad use of discretionary justiciability rules,254 an open-stanced
willingness to decline statutory jurisdiction,255 increased deployment of the
nondelegation principle,256 and (of particular importance for present
purposes) ready invocation of the vagueness and desuetude-statute rules.257
In a famous article, Professor Gerald Gunther responded that these
“passive virtues” were fraught with “subtle vices.”258 The Gunther critique
had three main parts. First, he argued that Professor Bickel had tossed aside
a “principled concern with threshold questions”259 in favor of an
expediency-driven “free-wheeling” style of inviting legislative second
looks.260 Next, Professor Gunther urged that this “‘passive virtues’”
approach did not so much encourage judicial restraint as foster judicial
dishonesty and abdication.261 Finally, Professor Gunther blasted Professor
Bickel for advocating the payment of these costs to gain only a paltry
benefit: the sometime avoidance of a supposed judicial “legitimation” of
troubling government programs not subject to principled invalidation.262 In
short, according to Professor Gunther, Professor Bickel offered the Court
too much discretion to take too little action to secure no meaningful
advantage.
The full force of Professor Gunther’s argument cannot be captured in one
paragraph. But precisely because it is so powerful, that critique provides
the platform for an argument against semisubstantive rules under reasoning
that goes something like this: semisubstantive rules, by definition, involve
second-look remands to government policymakers, and the encouragement
251. See id. (“[The] independent judiciary can remain that way only if the other branches
accept the importance of its independence.”).
252. BICKEL, supra note 8, at 111.
253. See id. at 112.
254. Id. at 183.
255. Id. at 127.
256. Id. at 159–61.
257. Id. at 147–56.
258. See generally Gunther, supra note 243.
259. Id. at 17.
260. Id. at 25; see id. at 21 (“Bickel invites . . . risks by viewing narrow constitutional
doctrines such as vagueness as essentially unprincipled means to avoid premature hardening
of substantive constitutional limitations.”).
261. Id. at 22–24.
262. Id. at 5–9.
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of such remands was at the heart of Professor Bickel’s agenda; Professor
Gunther challenged the Bickel program with a ravaging brilliance; thus
semisubstantive rules must go.
This line of logic, while superficially appealing, fails because there is a
broken link in its chain of inferences. The problem is that Professor
Gunther went after Professor Bickel’s larger project; he did not go after
semisubstantive rules.263 In mounting his critique, for example, Professor
Gunther voiced no objection to the vagueness doctrine or its
“instrumental[ist] purposes.”264 Rather, he challenged Professor Bickel’s
enthusiasm for using this doctrine and others as mere “devices”265 and
“unprincipled means”266 to “avoid legitimation at all costs.”267 To criticize
the unprincipled use of a rule is not to criticize the rule itself. In other
words, Professor Gunther’s critique casts no doubt on any semisubstantive
doctrine (including the vagueness rule) that is applied in a properly
principled manner.
Building on the work of Professor Gunther, then-Professor (and nowJudge) Calabresi raised a related set of questions about constitutionally
inspired semisubstantive doctrines.268 In doing so, he wrote,
Vagueness, delegation of authority, desuetude, yes, even ‘interpretation of
statutes,’ are doctrines and notions that have a meaning and function of
their own. Vagueness and desuetude, for example, are designed to require
that actors be warned of the possible consequences of their actions before
they act. . . . When such doctrines and notions are used not to achieve
these tasks but rather to require or induce legislatures to take a second
look, they are altered and become incapable of achieving their original
functions. . . . Gunther was worried about such false use of doctrines,
even in paraconstitutional cases. His worry [was] that this would lead to a
‘virulent variety of free-wheeling interventionism’ and involve the courts
in dangerous subterfuges . . . .269

263. Another, separate problem is that the great bulk of Professor Gerald Gunther’s
treatment of Bickelian doctrines dealt with matters of jurisdiction and justiciability. That
treatment may well have merit. But it possesses not a molehill of relevance with regard to
the separate subject of whether courts should use semisubstantive rules.
264. Gunther, supra note 243, at 21. For a discussion of the semisubstantive, attentionfocusing role of the vagueness rule, see Coenen, supra note 7, at 1629–30, 1795–800.
265. Gunther, supra note 243, at 20.
266. Id. at 21.
267. Id. at 15. In like fashion, Professor Gunther had no problem with clear-statementbased semisubstantive rules despite their remand-to-the-legislature qualities. After all,
political leaders have traditionally legislated against the backdrop of constitutionally driven
clear-statement rules, including the substantial-constitutional-question avoidance rule. In
these circumstances, legislators were (and still are) on fair notice that statutes that approach
the limits of constitutionality will receive a thorough judicial going-over. For this reason,
according to Professor Gunther, so long as courts tie second-look rules to the genuine
presence of ambiguity, critics cannot fault courts for engaging in “dangerous subterfuges,”
CALABRESI, supra note 85, at 20 (discussing Gunther’s view), or “free-wheeling
interventionism,” Gunther, supra note 243, at 25.
268. CALABRESI, supra note 85, at 20.
269. Id. at 19–20 (quoting Gunther, supra note 243, at 25).
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Judge Calabresi rightly noted that the “false use” of doctrine is not a good
thing. But any “false use” criticism requires a clear understanding of what a
“true use” is. The Court, for example, has made it clear that the vagueness
rule involves far more than ensuring “that actors be warned of the possible
consequences of their actions.”270 Indeed, Judge Calabresi himself went on
to recognize that it is “correct and uncontroversial” to view the doctrine as
“a temporizing device” that pushes political actors to take a “second look”
at policies that are both ambiguously articulated and constitutionally
problematic.271 If this is true, inclusion of the vagueness doctrine in the
semisubstantive-rule tool kit poses no difficulty. After all, if the vagueness
doctrine has a process-tied purpose, its use for process-tied reasons cannot
be decried as using “‘tricks.’”272
There is a broader point to make about Judge Calabresi’s expression of
concern about constitutionally driven semisubstantive rules. The point is
that he considered these rules from the distinctive perspective of exploring
the specialized subject of his provocative book—that is, the subject of how
to deal with the continued operation of numerous unrepealed statutes long
since made antiquated by changed conditions.273 The core of Judge
Calabresi’s argument was that the use of constitutionally driven
semisubstantive rules provides a crudely underinclusive way to deal with
this problem, especially because many outdated statutes do not present
Judge Calabresi’s
serious substantive constitutional difficulties.274
“underinclusiveness” argument may make sense, but it does not undermine
the argument for constitutionally driven semisubstantive rules. The reason
why is that the unifying purpose of these rules is not to get rid of archaic
statutes.275 If there is a need for a legal tool to clear away a sprawling
underbrush of outdated enactments, such a tool should be forged. But the
creation or noncreation of such a rule does not bear on the legitimacy of
semisubstantive doctrines that have an independently valuable role to play
as a specialized part of our constitutional law. Indeed, as we have seen in
examining assisted suicide laws, Judge Calabresi himself embraced with
enthusiasm constitutionally driven semisubstantive decision making.276
270. Id. at 19.
271. Id. at 17.
272. Id. at 20.
273. See generally id. at 1–3 (outlining overarching concerns that gave rise to the book).
274. Id. at 20.
275. Id. at 22–23. Indeed, eight of the nine doctrines of semisubstantive constitutional
law have nothing to do with a statute’s outdatedness. See supra note 22 (itemizing nine
doctrines).
276. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (discussing Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d
716, 732–35 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring)). In particular, he warmly embraced
constitutionally driven semisubstantive reasoning in voting to invalidate an assisted suicide
ban enacted in “another age,” long before the development of modern medicine and moral
outlooks that bear upon the subject. Id. at 732. As he explained,
When legislation comes close to violating fundamental substantive
constitutional rights or to running counter to the requirements of Equal
Protection, . . . there is . . . a long tradition of constitutional holdings that inertia
will not do. In such instances, courts have asserted the right to strike down statutes
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In sum, the Gunther and Calabresi analyses provide no problem for
semisubstantive rules. The probing work of these analysts hits around our
subject. In the end, however, that work exposes semisubstantive doctrines
only to smoke, not to fire.
G. Argument 7 (Futility): Structural Rules Are Rules of Futility—And Not
Legitimate Constitutional Rules at All—Because Policymakers Are Free
Simply To Readopt Any Program Invalidated Pursuant to Such a Rule
Arguments 1 through 6 proceed from the premise that structural rules
empower courts to do too much. Argument 7, in contrast, posits that these
rules empower courts to do too little. In particular, it has been said that
“structural review is not constitutional review at all” because “it imposes no
substantive limitations on legislative activity.”277 This critique begs the
question. Nothing in the Constitution says that that document imposes only
“substantive limitations on legislative activity.” Indeed, two key provisions
speak of “due process of law,”278 while other guarantees that are typically
seen as substantive in nature have spawned all sorts of process-centered
doctrines.279 Against this doctrinal backdrop, it rings hollow to assert that
structural review in its nature “conflicts with the premises of constitutional
theory.”280
It is particularly inaccurate—indeed, inaccurate in the extreme—to
describe semisubstantive review as entailing “futility.”281 As Professor
Theodore Eisenberg has observed in discussing constitutional “why” rules,
Some [lawmakers], after being informed that they initially acted
unconstitutionally, may refuse to vote for reenactment. [And] if a statute

and, before ruling on the ultimate validity of that legislation, to demand a present
and positive acknowledgment of the values that the legislators wish to further
through the legislation in issue.
Id. at 735 (emphasis added). In short, Judge Guido Calabresi himself came to embrace the
use of time-tied rules, at least in this instance, as a vehicle for protecting substantive
constitutional values.
277. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 211; see also Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336
U.S. 220, 224 (1949) (“[A] judiciary must judge by results, not by the varied factors which
may have determined legislators’ votes.”).
278. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added); see also supra note
21.
279. In public official defamation cases, for example, many procedural rules serve to
protect First Amendment values. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
254 (1986) (holding that on motion for summary judgment, lower courts must inquire into
convincing clarity of actual malice); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775
(1986) (noting plaintiff has burden of proof in cases governed by New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), or Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)); Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 500–03 (1984) (requiring appellate
courts to review de novo whether evidence of actual malice was clear and convincing); N.Y.
Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80 (evidence must show statement was made with actual
malice).
280. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 211.
281. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (noting that there exists an “element
of futility” in a motive based invalidation of a law).
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is invalidated on judicial review, the legislature often will decline or fail
to consider a new law. In many situations, therefore, judicial action on
the basis of motive results in an effective, not a futile, invalidation.282

At a minimum, remands to the legislature have the powerful effect of
shifting the “burden of inertia.”283 They also have practical impacts
because (as we have seen) members of legislative bodies come and go over
time.284 What is more, these rules always carry with them judicial
instructions that may focus, deepen, or otherwise reshape political-branch
decision making.285 Indeed, some semisubstantive rulings create very high
odds of enduring practical consequences; rules focused on forcing
reassessments of statutes that appear to have outlived their usefulness
illustrate the point.286

282. Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of
Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 116 (1977).
283. Farber & Frickey, supra note 203, at 918 n.253 (arguing that “merely shifting the
burden of inertia in the policymaking process itself can be significant” because proponents
of the invalidated law must bear the burden of lobbying Congress; because it is easier to
defeat legislation than obtain its passage, a remand to Congress “may as a practical matter
result in a policy’s ultimate demise”); see also ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CONFLICT 365 (1992) (“Legislation is always easier to block than to enact. . . . [T]his
provides significant added protection to the party who stands to gain from legislative
inaction.”).
284. This point seems to answer any argument that interest group pressures all but ensure
that “remanding an issue to the legislature . . . is futile because the mechanistic process of
legislation eliminates the possibility of a thoughtful legislative response.” Farber & Frickey,
supra note 203, at 876. What is more, this is the case even if one deems interest-group
pressures as decisive in the lawmaking process. Due to time’s passage, a judicially ordered
second look may protect constitutional values by mandating an affirmative override of them
by a legislature whose members represent interests quite different from the interests
represented by the members of the initially enacting legislature. Professors Daniel Farber
and Philip P. Frickey make this point in forceful terms:
To be sure, judicial invalidation under this approach constitutes only a suspensive
veto. Yet even that shifts the burden of inertia to those seeking to reimpose the
invalidated decision, highlights the perceived unfairness of the decision, and,
because of the passage of time, often presents the issue to a legislature constituted
somewhat differently from the one that made the original decision. Considering
the ease of killing legislation and the difficulty of passing it, these consequences of
a suspensive veto are significant.
Id. at 923.
285. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 25, at 17–18 (arguing that political allies of the Court
“will often have sufficient strength to deter elected officials from reversing a judicial
decision that vindicates the Constitution, especially after a judicial decision signals a conflict
of constitutional magnitude”). Judge Calabresi has expressed worry that second-look rulings
may shape legislative behavior in negative ways. He supposes, for example, that some state
legislators made post-Furman votes for the death penalty on the ground of political
expediency because they assumed the courts would strike down any newly enacted law.
CALABRESI, supra note 85, at 26–27. This concern, however, is speculative and probably
overdrawn. In any event, the proper solution to this problem, if it exists, is not for judges to
scrap semisubstantive rules altogether, but for legislators to act responsibly. If judges want a
sober second look, they should tell legislators exactly that, and legislators in turn should not
assume that judges do not mean what they say.
286. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 1874 (noting strong possibility of law-reform effects
worked by time-tied “when” rules).
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All of these observations show why lawmakers often will not
automatically respond to suspensive interventions with program
reenactments.287 But even if the futility argument did have empirical
validity, that argument would be open to serious challenge on the ground
that there is value in proper process itself. Do we really want courts to turn
a blind eye when they learn that a state’s facially neutral voterdisenfranchisement rule was the product of rank racist hatred?288 Do we
really want courts to stand idly by when they discover that a sloppily
slapped-together affirmative action program came about due to a spoils
system based on skin color?289 In cases of this nature, even if reenactment
of the program is predictable, concerns about the integrity and legitimacy of
government behavior push hard for at least a thoughtful reconsideration.
Just as rules of procedural due process in the adjudicative context have an
“intrinsic value” apart from “the right to secure a different outcome,”290
semisubstantive safeguards have a role to play in “‘generating the feeling,
so important to a popular government, that justice has been done.’”291
H. Argument 8 (Constitutional Underenforcement): Semisubstantive Rules
Will Induce Courts To Underenforce Constitutional Norms
The futile-gesture argument suggests that judges who wield
semisubstantive doctrines do too little because they do nothing at all. As
we have seen, this logic is faulty.292 There is, however, a related argument
that raises a greater concern. That argument posits that semisubstantive
safeguards may cause courts to under-judge.293 The idea is that the
287. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 8, at 166 (“The Court’s action in remanding the issue to
Congress [in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958),] bore some fruit. Hearings and quite
extensive consideration followed, and a relatively moderate and well-drawn bill passed the
House. In the Senate there were hearings and a number of bills, but in the end no legislation,
at least not yet.”); Farber & Frickey, supra note 203, at 923–24 (noting President
Eisenhower’s failure to secure congressional reinstatement of travel ban struck down in
Kent); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 337, 377–78, 416 (1991) (noting the infrequency with which
judicial interpretations of statutes are overridden by Congress). If further evidence of
nonfutility is needed, it is supplied by the experience of other nations. See Bateup, supra
note 23, at 1120 (suggesting that override power available to the legislative branch, under the
Canadian Constitution, “has rarely been employed”); Ward, supra note 25, at 20 n.61
(agreeing that the legislative override in Canada “has not played a significant role” and
collecting authorities).
288. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); supra notes 80–84 and
accompanying text.
289. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989), the Court
detected just such a risk, although three dissenters argued vigorously that they were wrong.
290. TRIBE, supra note 131, § 10-7, at 666.
291. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
292. See supra notes 281–87 and accompanying text.
293. See Calabresi, supra note 21, at 104 n.71 (“When he first described such a scheme of
judicial review, Bickel was criticized for providing too narrow and conservative a role for
the judiciary.”); Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 391–92 (“[I]f due process of lawmaking was
employed only where strict scrutiny otherwise applied, it might end up displacing
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availability of semisubstantive rules will lead judicial authorities to use
these rules to the exclusion of hard-and-fast substantive doctrines that form
the proper core of constitutional law.
In other words, because
semisubstantive doctrines are available, judges will use them too much, use
substantive rules too little, and thus underenforce important constitutional
norms.294
This argument has force if its basic premise is true, for constitutional
rules should be suspect if in fact they lead to an unwarranted dilution of
constitutional rights. There is, however, a difficulty with the argument
because its underlying premise is doubtful.
To begin with, the
underenforcement argument seems to posit—contrary to the history most of
us remember—that judges have a disinclination to use hard-and-fast rules
of constitutional decision making.295 In fact, the present-day Court uses
hard-and-fast rules with regularity despite the ready availability of
semisubstantive doctrinal alternatives.296 No less important, the availability
of semisubstantive rules may well cause courts to vindicate constitutional
norms by way of a second-look approach when those norms would
substantive judicial review altogether.”); Schrock & Welsh, supra note 207, at 1149 (noting
“scruples about . . . possible devaluation of the Constitution” inherent in constitutional
common law); cf. Bateup, supra note 23, at 1130 (expressing worry about the way in which
semisubstantive rules and substantive rules of judicial decision making interact, particularly
as to when courts should use one technique or the other).
294. See, e.g., Schrock & Welsh, supra note 207, at 1165 (“[S]ubconstitutionalizing
rights places them on a less firm foundation, since a common law rule is reversible by
Congress while a constitutional right is not.”); see also Calabresi, supra note 21, at 135–36
(“I would avoid the application of [hard-and-fast] protections to even such popular, openended concepts as the ‘right to privacy.’”); Sandalow, supra note 29, at 1190 (arguing that
the perceived need to use judicial review to protect minorities should be tempered with an
understanding that “the political process leading to [legislative] decisions contains
prodigious internal safeguards for [minorities’] interests,” particularly in the “effect upon the
political process of the extraordinary variety of interest groups . . . and the crosscutting
loyalties and identifications that exist among the members of such groups”). Professors
William Buzbee and Robert Schapiro argue that the Court “should take responsibility for the
decision and not attempt to shift the blame to Congress” by using semisubstantive rules.
Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 143; see also Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 375
(arguing that the Court has a duty to strike an unconstitutional statute and “may not properly
avoid this responsibility by conditioning its adherence to the statute on congressional
compliance with procedural requirements beyond those set forth in Article I, Section 7”).
295. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 21, at 135 (noting that there is “consensus over the
propriety of [hard-and-fast] protection for certain categories of rights,” including “at least . . .
most of the enumerated rights”).
296. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas sodomy law
on substantive due process grounds); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609–19
(2000) (invalidating federal sex-based violence law on federalism grounds even though
states widely supported it and Congress made extensive findings designed to show effects on
interstate commerce); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180–83 (1992) (rejecting
defense of federal legislation that “commandeered” regulatory processes of New York,
despite the involvement and support of state officials in the act’s passage); Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986) (asserting, in striking
down restrictions on speech not justified by a compelling state interest, that “we do not
assume a legislative role, but fulfill our judicial duty—to enforce the demands of the
Constitution”).
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otherwise go wholly unprotected.297 Put another way, the use of
semisubstantive review may induce courts to give constitutional rights a
measure of protection they would not receive if only hard-and-fast rules
were on the scene.
Indeed, for this reason, the availability of
semisubstantive rules may well cause courts to avoid underenforcing
constitutional protections.
How all of this comes out in the wash is not apparent. But there is little
reason to suppose that, all things considered, judicial use of semisubstantive
doctrines will lead to an underenforcement of constitutional rights.298
I. Argument 9 (Flawed Premises): Semisubstantive Rules—Or at Least
Many of Them—Rest on Simplistic or Contrived Notions About the Nature
of Lawmaking Processes
Rules that target political processes should reflect political realities. Do
semisubstantive doctrines comport with this notion? Some commentators
have claimed they do not. Professor Tushnet, for example, has asserted that
the Court ignored political realities in issuing such structural decisions as
Bakke and Mow Sun Wong.299 In the latter case, he says, the Court erred in
assuming that the Federal Civil Service Commission myopically focused on
employment-efficiency issues, while paying no attention whatsoever to
foreign policy concerns. The problem with this reasoning, Professor
Tushnet says, is that the outlawed rule was “undoubtedly produced after a
study by members of the Commission’s staff, who most certainly consulted
both formally and informally with members of other staffs knowledgeable

297. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 192, at 468 (reasoning that courts may underenforce
constitutional rights if only hard-and-fast review is available, but that courts can close the
gap by engaging in aggressive statutory construction that vindicates constitutional norms);
see also Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court,
119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 89 (2005) (noting in his discussion on the significance of
constitutional amendment processes that “[j]ust as dogs bark more ferociously when they are
behind a fence, judges indulge their personal views more blatantly when they know they
don’t have the last word”).
298. See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 29, at 52 (“[T]he Court would remain the ‘ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution’—indeed, a more powerful and effective interpreter, given the
addition of a new and important jurisprudential tool that would supplement, not replace, the
Court’s traditional practice of final judicial review.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962))); see also
Calabresi, supra note 21, at 103 (noting that even “Bickel did not, of course, believe in
courts having only [a semisubstantive] function” but that he supported use of traditional
hard-and-fast judicial review as well); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 79 (1985) (arguing that the “original constitutional
framework was based on an understanding that national representatives should be largely
insulated from constituent pressures,” and that, with the decline of that system, “it is neither
surprising nor inappropriate that the judicial role has expanded [so] that some of the
deliberative tasks no longer performed by national representatives have been transferred to
the courts”).
299. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 207; see also supra notes 105–14 and accompanying text
(discussing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976)).

COENEN FINAL

2009]

4/26/2009 8:59:52 PM

“SEMISUBSTANTIVE” CONSTITUTIONAL RULES

2885

about foreign policy.”300 Likewise, he asserts that Justice Powell erred in
assuming in Bakke that the University of California, Davis, admissions
program “was paid not the slightest bit of attention” by the politically
accountable California legislature when that legislature had an obvious
interest in overseeing key affirmative-action decisions made by college
administrators.301 Thus, each of these rulings, he concludes, “is predicated
on a vision of an imaginary policymaking process.”302
At the outset, it bears noting that Professor Tushnet’s comments are
directed only at “who” rules and, for that matter, at only two who-rule
cases; those comments thus cast no shadow over other semisubstantive
doctrines. No less important, Professor Tushnet’s critique of Mow Sun
Wong and Bakke is itself overdrawn. For example, in pooh-poohing the upthe-chain-of-command “who” rule of Bakke, Professor Tushnet asserts that
state legislators—no less than university officials—“are insulated from
political accountability” because “incumbents have an automatic electoral
advantage against opponents.”303 But state legislators (unlike university
officials) are subject to election, and their “electoral advantage” is not an
electoral lock (particularly if they take unpopular positions on the
concededly “sensitive” and “controversial” issues raised by affirmative
Even more important, Professor Tushnet’s
action programs).304
minimization of the differing levels of accountability of agencies and
legislatures ignores elementary principles of political science. Those
principles, after all, leave no doubt that “constituent and contributor
interests [do] influence legislators” in a way they do not influence
appointed officials because “reelection is an important motive.”305
In any event, one can embrace Professor Tushnet’s premises without
endorsing his conclusions. It is true that policymaking systems are
“complex”306 and that different decision-making units—for example, the
Civil Service Commission and the President in one instance, or the
California legislature and the state Board of Regents in another—are not
sealed off from one another with hermetic neatness. It is also the case,
however, that different decision-making bodies do have different
competencies, different constituencies, and different capacities for
deliberation, representation, and accountability. With regard to Mow Sun
Wong, for example, even Professor Tushnet concedes that “the
Commission’s staff process would probably give more weight to personnel
considerations and less to foreign policy [considerations] than the
President’s staff process would.”307 But if that is true, the Court’s whobased reasoning in the case is defensible for that very reason.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 206 (emphasis added).
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 207–08.
Farber & Frickey, supra note 203, at 900.
TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 207.
Id. at 207 n.48.
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Finally, it is important not to throw out the baby with the bathwater.308
Proper development of semisubstantive safeguards—like proper
development of all constitutional rules—necessarily will turn on contextual
decisions made by conscientious judges confronted with an unfolding series
of cases. If, in this process, it appears that a particular semisubstantive
“who” rule “misconceives the policymaking process,”309 the proper
response is not to junk “who” rules altogether. Instead, the proper response
is to reshape those rules to bring them more in line with policymaking
realities.
This same point helps to diminish the force of attacks on findings-andstudy-based “how” rules, such as the rule deployed in Garrett.310 In recent
years, a cottage industry of criticism directed at these rules has sprung up in
the academic community.311 One complaint is that findings-and-study rules
mistakenly equate legislatures with administrative agencies.312 The
overarching point is that so-called “hard-look” rules have long and properly
been directed at administrative agencies in light of their distinctive
characteristics—such as a lack of electoral accountability and a duty to
implement statutory mandates—that legislative bodies do not share.313
308. See Coenen, supra note 11, at 1371–75 (discussing frequency with which the
Rehnquist Court has shown openness to applying “‘who’” rules).
309. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 206.
310. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
311. See, e.g., Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 332–39, 383–86 (noting that formal
legislative record does not reveal proper reliance upon informal and extrarecord sources such
as views of constituents, ex parte communications with interest groups, and information
gathered by congressional agencies); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 96 (“No set of
compiled written materials will provide a comprehensive record of what influenced
legislative action.”); Colker & Brudney, supra note 30, at 117 (asserting that semisubstantive
rules “[fail] to appreciate the skill and sophistication that Congress brings” in legislation
“through a range of informal contacts”). Of particular significance, Professor Frickey—who
serves as something of a jedi-master in this field—has stepped back from his earlier
optimism about findings-and-study rules to take a far more skeptical stance. Compare
Frickey & Smith, supra note 11, at 1733–36 (listing a myriad of problems with findings-andstudy rules), with Farber & Frickey, supra note 203, at 926 (“‘[D]ue process of lawmaking’
has the potential to strengthen the democratic process.”); Frickey, supra note 228, at 697–98.
For some less critical appraisals, see Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial
Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
757, 760 (1996) (suggesting that findings-and-study rules may “facilitate the exercise of
judicial review and improve interbranch communication”); Harold J. Krent, Turning
Congress into an Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 731, 733–34 (1996) (noting the rule’s potential to increase accountability and
help in vindicating otherwise underenforced constitutional norms).
312. See Krent, supra note 311, at 746 (“Treating Congress as a glorified administrative
agency cuts against our system of government, which embraces the norm of majoritarian rule
through the democratic process.”); see also Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 331 (“[T]he
reasons that justify ‘on-the-record’ review in the administrative [agency] context . . . do not
apply to the legislative branch.”); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 120 (arguing that
legislative record review is similar to administrative action review, but even “more
probing”).
313. See Harold J. Krent, Reviewing Agency Action for Inconsistency with Prior Rules
and Regulations, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1187, 1187 (1997) (noting necessity of external
monitoring, in light of bureaucrats’ “lack of political accountability”).
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These reasons for applying hard-look rules to agencies do not apply to
legislatures. Thus (so the argument goes) it makes no sense to apply these
sorts of rules in policing the enactment of a statute.
Semisubstantive findings-and-study rules, however, may benefit
lawmaking processes even if the challenges faced by legislatures differ
greatly from the challenges faced by agencies.314 Heart disease and
headaches are very different things. This fact does not mean, however, that
aspirin cannot work effectively against both conditions. Put another way,
the question is not whether agencies and legislatures are different. The
question is whether, even though they are different, findings-and-study
rules (that target legislatures only when specialized constitutional dangers
are present) have a useful role to play in safeguarding constitutional values.
And there are a variety of reasons to conclude they do.315
Critics of findings-and-study rules also focus on the many impediments
that get in the way of legislative consideration of constitutional concerns.
In their view, it makes little sense to remand matters to legislatures so that
they can reconsider constitutional difficulties when legislatures by nature
lack adeptness in processing constitutional arguments.316 No one contends,
however, that findings-and-study rules are a lawmaking panacea. Rather,
their function is to poke and nudge.317 It may be—as critics assert—that
most legislative findings concerning constitutional matters end up being
314. See, e.g., Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 97 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (justifying findings-and-study approach in part based on “the unfortunate fact
that Congress is too busy to do all of its work as carefully as it should”); Goldfeld, supra
note 25, at 370 (suggesting value of findings-based rule when “a particular policy did not
receive even minimal deliberation,” which can happen in legislative process, in part because
of floor amendments).
315. See supra notes 58–68 and accompanying text. An ancillary argument in this
context is that forcing Congress to create a substantive legislative record overlooks resulting
opportunity costs; put another way, legislatures may have to forego valuable alternative
activities because they have to adhere to the Court’s findings-and-study rules. Bryant &
Simeone, supra note 30, at 384 (asserting that “[b]y imposing on Congress the duty to create
a record . . . the Court threatens to limit the other legitimate purposes served by
congressional proceedings” and that the Court’s approach “will likely have the undesirable
consequence of diverting scarce congressional resources”); Colker & Brudney, supra note
30, at 120 (arguing that “[r]edirecting Congress’s way of doing business . . . imposes
substantial opportunity costs”); see also Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 11, at 135 (stating
that, while the Court does “not prohibit . . . informal modes of communication and
access, . . . by creating a requirement that the legislature establish a recorded factual basis for
a legislative action, the Court has created incentives for a shift in emphasis . . . to more
formal modes of deliberation”). One answer to this critique is that it seems unduly alarmist.
The Court has not signaled that findings-centered review techniques will apply large
numbers of legislative undertakings. Rather, all signs indicate that the Court has reserved
this style of review only for cases that involve particularly sensitive constitutional issues. See
supra notes 25, 123 and accompanying text.
316. See, e.g., Frickey & Smith, supra note 11, at 1745 (asserting that “when conflict of
interests is present and when policy is therefore constructed through a competitive process of
coalition building, bargaining, and voting, the Court is asking too much” when it requires
agency-like behavior of Congress).
317. See Sunstein, supra note 23, at 37 (“[C]ourts should provide spurs and prods
when . . . deliberation is absent.”).
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written by committee personnel who are excessively responsive to interest
group demands.318 Even if this is the case, however, at least some people at
some level in the lawmaking process are giving some attention to
constitutional values.319 Critics also argue that most representatives
couldn’t care less about findings and studies because ensuring reelection,
fundraising, and vote-trading dominate their thoughts.320 Even so, shining
a light on enduring principles may influence at least some legislators’
thinking. It also will send a proper message to lawmakers that, in all their
work, they must keep the Constitution in view.321
Finally, it may be that legislative findings have a busy-work quality.322
At the least, however, findings-and-study rules often generate the practical
consequence of triggering the remand of a previously enacted law to the
legislature for a second look. When semisubstantive rules have this effect,
they couple bi-temporalism with bicameralism in a way that impedes
precisely the sort of “rash and hasty” decision making that most concerned
the Framers.323 What is more, in the face of a judicial remand, elected
officials cannot simply ignore what the court has done. Proponents of the
scuttled legislation will have to consider why the court demanded further
action; otherwise they can have no assurance that their efforts at reinstating
the law will prove effective.324 Political-branch adversaries of the

318. See Goldfeld, supra note 25, at 418 (noting that some groups question the use of
legislative history in statutory interpretation “in part to minimize the influence of interest
groups—because such groups are able to get language into legislative history that they are
unable to get into statutory language”).
319. Cf. Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 610–12 (2002) (suggesting that “lobbyist
involvement [may] actually [be] a form of deliberation and participation”).
320. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1979) (emphasizing that legislatures “see their primary
function in terms of registering the actual, occurrent preferences of the people—what they
want and what they believe should be done”); Mikva, supra note 250, at 606 (“[F]or the
most part the legislators are motivated by a desire to enact any particular piece of legislation
that fills the perceived needs of the moment.”); id. at 588 (adding that legislatures are not
“‘institutionally suited to search for the meaning of constitutional values’” (quoting Fiss,
supra, at 10)).
321. Findings-and-study rules may serve other purposes as well. See, e.g., Goldfeld,
supra note 25, at 369 (“[P]lacing a floor on the level of deliberation required to enact a law
could help improve the quality of . . . political accountability.”); see also supra note 203
(noting possible benefits of diminishing tensions between Congress and the courts and of
enhancing the quality of judicial review by supplying useful information).
322. Sunstein, supra note 298, at 76 (claiming that, if representatives were forced to act in
Madisonian mold, they would, at most, produce “‘boilerplate’—rationalizations designed to
placate the courts—rather than a genuine critical inquiry into issues of value and fact”).
323. 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 61 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (quoting A
Citizen, CARLISLE GAZETTE & WESTERN REPOSITORY OF KNOWLEDGE, Oct. 24, 1787); see
also Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle,
111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2240 n.261 (1998) (noting that requiring Congress to gather facts,
even absent a remand, “may lengthen time for deliberation”). See generally supra notes 143–
50 and accompanying text (discussing concerns about passionate, short-sighted action of
political decision makers expressed in The Federalist).
324. See supra notes 11, 14–15, 19–20 and accompanying text.
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legislation are also sure to take heed of the court’s directives. Those
directives after all, will point out difficulties with the provisionally
invalidated measure (as well as potential obstacles to its successful
reenactment), thus “call[ing] forth . . . opposition” and providing that
opposition with useful tools of argument.325 In short, a judicial remand
inevitably requires reconsideration after the passage of time, while creating
some measure of heightened focus on constitutional complications as that
reconsideration occurs. It seems plausible to conclude that, at least
sometimes, these conditions will cause legislatures to resurrect
provisionally invalidated laws only if especially powerful justifications for
reviving them exist.326
Legislative findings-and-study rules cannot purge passions and raw
politics from all instances of legislative behavior. At the same time, it is
hard to see what better tools courts can use to push along the sort of
meaningful deliberation the Framers envisioned when pressing risks to
basic rights or constitutional structures appear.327 In the end, critiques of
findings-and-study rules both ask too much of, and fear too much from, this
form of semisubstantive review. Legislative findings-and-study rules do
not seek to move the earth. Rather, they operate in modest fashion, in a
limited number of settings, to tilt lawmaking processes in such a direction
that they will take some account of important constitutional values.328 In
this way, findings-and-study rules promote—in a distinctively self-limiting
and minimally disruptive way—the most salient purposes of our
constitutional plan.
J. Argument 10 (Novelty): Structural Rules Should Be Viewed as Suspect
and Unstable Because They Depart from the Path Ordinarily Traveled in
the Formulation of Constitutional Law
If this Article has accomplished nothing else, it has dismantled any
challenge to semisubstantive rules based on the notion that they are new
and exotic.329 In fact, semisubstantive rules draw strong support from
325. This point was highlighted to me in informal communication with Professor (and
former Oregon Supreme Court Justice) Hans Linde.
326. It is true, of course, that in some circumstances, “especially powerful justifications”
will not exist, but that instead, reenactment of the same or a similar law will result from the
exertion of raw political power of self-interest groups. Even in these cases, however,
shifting the burden of inertia onto the backs of those groups will at least ensure that the law
is reenacted in response to distinctively powerful democratic forces. And if no genuinely
public-regarding justification for the law is identifiable, it remains open to courts to
invalidate the law pursuant to due-process or equal-protection rationality review. See CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 29 (3d ed. 1997) (describing rationality review as a
requirement that “public measures must be a minimally reasonable effort to promote some
public value”).
327. See supra notes 143–50 and accompanying text (collecting passages on this point
from The Federalist).
328. See supra notes 317–19 and accompanying text.
329. This Article does not stand alone in pointing out the deep historical tradition of
semisubstantive rules. See BICKEL, supra note 8, at 70–71 (stating that “over the years, [the
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related principles—like First Amendment procedural rules330 and meansdriven doctrines331—that are settled features of the constitutional landscape.
Even more important, many semisubstantive tools of decision making—
such as motive-based doctrines,332 clear statement rules,333 and
constitutional common law334—have roots that reach back to the earliest
days of the Republic.
Most important of all, semisubstantive interventions are both numerous
and increasingly common in the Supreme Court’s modern-day work.335
The Court’s many structural decisions thus work hand in hand to lend
precedential support to one another. That there are four major strains of
semisubstantive decision making, each of which has multiple
subcomponents, explodes the notion that this style of review is nothing
more than a party-crashing interloper at the table of constitutional law.
CONCLUSION
Semisubstantive reasoning pervades constitutional law. Given this
reality, analysts must begin to give these doctrines more systematic
attention than they have received in the past. In this Article, I have tried to
push this process forward by exploring the many normative questions to
which these rules give rise. In the future, much debate about the wisdom,
legitimacy, and proper shape of semisubstantive doctrines is certain to
occur. But if moderation is a virtue, as our greatest philosophers have
taught,336 there is at least something to be said for the provisional,
politically reversible style of decision making represented by this body of
doctrine.
What I have written about semisubstantive rules I offer in the spirit of
tentativeness that a still-unfolding evaluation of a still-unfolding
phenomenon deserves. But about one thing my conclusions are not
Court has] developed an almost inexhaustible arsenal of techniques and devices” that
“engage the Court in a Socratic colloquy with the other institutions of government and with
society as a whole concerning the necessity for this or that measure, for this or that
compromise”). But see Bryant & Simeone, supra note 30, at 331, 369 (arguing that the
Court’s approach “is simply inconsistent with [its] own precedents” that have not been
overruled).
330. See supra note 279.
331. See Coenen, supra note 7, at 1823–28 (developing this argument).
332. See supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text.
333. See United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (1805) (“[W]here
fundamental principles are overthrown . . . the legislative intention must be expressed with
irresistible clearness . . . .”).
334. See supra notes 152–54, 224 and accompanying text (discussing Cooley v. Bd. of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819)).
335. See generally Coenen, supra note 11 (describing the Rehnquist Court’s widespread
use of semisubstantive review).
336. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 111 (H. Rackham trans., 1968) (stating
“that moral virtue is a mean, and in what sense this is so, namely that it is a mean between
two vices, one of excess and the other of defect; and that it is such a mean because it aims at
hitting the middle point in feelings and in actions”).
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tentative at all: courts will continue to encounter invitations to take
semisubstantive approaches to cases that come in many forms. As judges
grapple with these cases, they can only profit from what this Article invites
others to help elaborate—a systematic evaluation of semisubstantive
safeguards of constitutional limits on government power.

